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A Meticulous Food Safety Plan Today Avoids Handcuffs Tomorrow
Kim Bousquet*
In August 2010, thousands of people across the United States 
were poisoned by eating eggs unknowingly tainted with Salmonella 
enteritidis bacteria.1 Following a lengthy investigation, the owners of the 
facility where the outbreak began were sentenced to three months in 
prison.2 This is not a one-off case; poor food safety practices are 
responsible for several outbreaks and often end in incarceration.3 
Filthy hen houses, diseased fruit storage, and negligent food 
processing may be the last thing we want to imagine, but these 
practices have much to teach today’s food producers.
This article first examines how poor food production 
practices can lead to an environment ripe for spread of disease and an 
unacceptable level of contamination. Then, it explores what companies
*Kim Bousquet, JD, MS, is a partner in the St. Louis, Missouri, law firm Thompson
Coburn LLP.  Kim received her JD from the University of Oregon School of Law and
her Masters of Science in Environmental Studies also from the University of Oregon.  
Kim is currently a candidate in the Food and Agricultural Law LLM program at the 
University of Arkansas.  Kim’s LLM work focuses on food safety and food labeling 
laws.
1   Multistate Outbreak of Human Salmonella Enteritidis Infections Associated with 
Shell Eggs (Final Update), Ctr. For Disease Control (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.cdc. 
gov/salmonella/2010/shell-eggs-12-2-10.html.
2  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Quality Egg, Company Owner and Top Executive 
Sentenced in Connection with Distribution of Adulterated Eggs (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quality-egg-company-owner-and-top-executive-sentenced-
connection-distribution-adulterated.
3  See List of Selected Outbreak Investigations Linked to Food, by Year, Ctr. For 
Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/outbreaks.html (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2018); see also Kathy Hardee, Criminal Prosecutions in the Food Industry: 
Adulteration and Prison Time, FoodSafety Magazine (June 18, 2015), https://www. 
foodsafetymagazine.com/enewsletter/criminal-prosecutions-in-the-food-industry-
adulteration-and-prison-time/. 
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can do to prevent such unacceptable conditions, decrease the 
likelihood and severity of an outbreak and, of course, avoid 
incarceration.
The Salmonella That Sickened America
A Salmonella infection, or salmonellosis, is a dangerous and 
potentially fatal disease.4 Most people with salmonellosis experience 
diarrhea, stomach cramps, and fever for several days.5 The diarrhea 
can be so severe that some people need to be hospitalized.6 If the 
infection spreads to the bloodstream — which is more common 
in people with compromised immune systems — the victim may 
succumb to the illness and die.7 According to some reports, as many as 
56,000 Americans were sickened during the 2010 tainted egg 
outbreak.8
The Salmonella outbreak was traced back to eggs produced 
by a single company based in Iowa notorious for its scoff-law tactics: 
Quality Eggs, LLC.9 Faced with information tracing the contamination 
back to its facilities — courtesy of sleuthing regulators10 — Quality 
Egg recalled over 500 million eggs, one of the largest egg recalls 
in U.S. history.11 Quality Egg pled guilty to: (1) felony bribing of 
a USDA inspector; (2) felony introduction of misbranded eggs 
into interstate commerce with intent to defraud and mislead, and; (3) 
misdemeanor introduction of adulterated eggs into interstate 
commerce.12 
4  What is Salmonella?, Ctr. For Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/




8  David Pitt, Egg Executives in 2010 Salmonella Case Must Report to Prison, 
The Seattle Times (June 27, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/egg-
executives-in-salmonella-case-must-report-to-prison/. 
9  United States v. Quality Egg, LLC., 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (N.D. Iowa 2015), aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016).
10  Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp 3d at 923 (“After the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) presented epidemiologic information to Quality Egg, the defendants voluntarily 
recalled millions of dozens of eggs in 2010.”). 
11 Half a Billion Eggs Have Been Recalled, CNN (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.cnn. 
com/2010/HEALTH/,08/20/eggs.recall.salmonella/index.html.




The Crimes That Spread the Salmonella
The Quality Egg outbreak story is truly sensational for a 
number of reasons, but especially for the company’s blatant disregard 
for cleanliness and the horrid conditions of the egg-laying facilities 
discovered during the FDA’s inspection. However, the case is often 
only discussed from the perspective of a corporate officer wondering 
if they are next to face prosecution for a food safety violation. Those 
concerns are justified. Jack and Peter DeCoster, the father and son 
duo who owned and managed Quality Egg, were prosecuted under a 
provision of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act providing 
strict liability for introducing adulterated food in interstate commerce. 
21 U.S.C. §331(a).13 Other corporate officers, though not many, have 
also been prosecuted under this provision as “responsible corporate 
officers” of food companies.14
Following a plea deal, the DeCosters paid hefty fines and 
eventually spent three months in prison.15 They were shocked by their 
prison sentences (issued by Mark Bennett, District Judge for the 
Northern District of Iowa) and appealed to the Eighth Circuit for 
relief. The Eighth Circuit upheld the prison sentences even though the 
DeCosters did not have personal knowledge that Quality Egg had 
shipped adulterated eggs.16 The Eighth Circuit held the sentences did 
not violate Due Process even though there was no intent element of 
their misdemeanor crimes. As the court explained: “[t]he elimination 
of a mens rea requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause 
for a public welfare offense where the penalty is ‘relatively small,’ 
the conviction does not gravely damage the defendant’s reputation, 
and congressional intent supports the imposition of the penalty.”17  
13  Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 923 (“Austin “Jack” DeCoster owned and 
controlled the activities of Quality Egg. Peter DeCoster, Austin DeCoster’s son, was 
the Chief 
Operating Officer of Quality Egg.”). 
14  See id. at 937 (detailing two instances in which other corporate officers have been 
prosecuted as “reasonable corporate officers” under 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)).
15  DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 631. 
16  Id. at 642.
17  Id. at 633.
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 Moreover, the defendants were not convicted for the wrongs 
of their subordinates; they were guilty for allowing FDCA violations 
when they knew or should have known of the unsanitary conditions 
that directly led to the violations.18 Though the DeCosters’ plea 
agreements claimed they did not know the eggs were contaminated, 
they admitted they were in positions of sufficient authority to detect, 
prevent, and correct the sale of contaminated eggs had they known 
about the contamination.19 Under the FDCA, this was sufficient to 
make them guilty of misdemeanor crimes as responsible corporate 
officers.20 
The Questions We Should Be Asking to Prevent Criminal FDCA 
Violations
Given these types of cases, corporate officers have reason to 
be concerned about the liability risks of running and owning a food 
business. Criminal strict liability for FDCA violations is a real 
possibility. However, while criminal liability for c-suite executives 
and quality control officers is an important concern, preventing death 
and severe illness from the shipment and sale of adulterated food is a 
much more important matter. The mental and physical harm incurred 
from a foodborne illness can be debilitating and impose a sentence 
much more severe than the three-month prison terms the DeCosters 
served. 
Fortunately, the goals of avoiding criminal liability and 
preventing foodborne illness go hand in hand. I would suggest, 
however, instead of focusing on how food executives can avoid 
prosecution, food companies should ask the following question: How 
can we create a culture and environment that makes food safety a top 
18  Id. (“Under the FDCA… a Corporate officer is held accountable not for the acts or 
omissions of others, but rater for his own failure to prevent or remedy ‘the condition 
which gave rise to the charges against him.’” (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 
658, 675 (1975))).
19  Id. at 631.
20  Id. at 632.
[Vol.14
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priority and encourages employees to express food safety concerns and 
follow established food safety protocol? 
What Practices Have Led to Outbreaks Resulting in Criminal Liability?  
We can examine a handful of cases involving criminal 
food safety violations in pursuit of creating a better food safety culture. 
One is the case of Quality Egg LLC, mentioned above. Quality 
Egg’s massive egg laying system housed upwards of 7 million 
chickens which produced 5.5 million eggs a day.21 Large facilities 
containing millions of live animals provide excellent 
conditions for the introduction and spread of illness.22 
Preventing disease calls for extreme care. 
Quality Egg engaged in the opposite. The company allowed 
and created conditions that fostered the growth and spread of disease 
by: (1) failing to keep live and dead rodents, frogs, and flying 
insects out of their facilities; (2) failing to remove manure from the egg 
laying facilities such that it filled entire rooms and burst through 
facility doors; (3) failing to clean and sanitize equipment; and (4) 
failing to comply with written food safety plans.23 As a result, the 
Salmonella contamination spread throughout the company’s entire 
facilities and pushed the company’s Salmonella presence rate nearly 40 
times higher than the national rate.24 Following the criminal 
investigation, the government discovered Quality Egg had also 
covered up its food safety problems, thereby prolonging and 
intensifying the outbreak.25 Quality Egg had falsified food safety 
records, lied to its customer’s auditors about food safety measures, 
21  Egg Recall Hits 550M, One of Largest in History, CBS News (Aug. 21, 2010), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/egg-recall-hits-550m-one-of-largest-in-history/.
22  Fiona Harvey et. al, Rise of Mega Farms: How the US Model of 
Intensive Farming is Invading the World, The Guardian (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/18/rise-of-mega-farms-how-the-
us-model-of-intensive-farming-is-invading-the-world.
23  See DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 630-631; United States v. Quality Egg, LLC., 99 F. Supp. 
3d 920, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2015).
24  DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 630.
25  Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 927–31.
2018] A Meticulous Food Safety Plan
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falsified packing dates on pallets of eggs, and bribed USDA 
officials so it could sell inferior eggs.26 
Another notorious case involves Peanut Corporation of 
America (PCA). Stewart Parnell, company president, and Michael 
Parnell, corporate officer, of PCA stood trial in 2014 for multiple 
federal crimes stemming from shipping adulterated peanut butter and 
peanut paste into interstate commerce.27 Shipping peanut products 
knowingly tainted with Salmonella typhimurium earned them felony 
convictions, and two decades each in prison.28 At least 714 people 
were sickened by the Salmonella; at least nine people lost their lives 
fighting salmonellosis infections caused by the negligent and 
intentional conduct of the Parnells and PCA.29
What went wrong? Because they are grown on the ground, 
peanuts are generally more susceptible to encountering pathogenic 
bacteria than certain other foods.30 As such, peanut producers should 
be acutely aware of the higher potential for contamination and strive to 
eliminate the risk of contaminated peanuts entering commerce, 
something PCA ignored. Further, since PCA was a large peanut 
producer, their products were essentially everywhere. They also 
supplied large amounts of product to many vulnerable populations, 
including products used in school lunches, children’s snack products, 
nursing homes, and hospitals.31 PCA’s process also mixed together 
26  Id.
27  Moni Basu, Unprecedented Verdict: Peanut Executive Guilty in Deadly Salmonella 
Outbreak, CNN (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/us/peanut-butter-
salmonella-trial/index.html.
28  Moni Basu, 28 Years for Salmonella: Peanut Exec Gets Groundbreaking Sentence, 
CNN, (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/21/us/salmonella-peanut-exec-
sentenced/index.html.
29  Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections Linked to Peanut 
Butter, 2008-2009 (FINAL UPDATE), Ctr. For Disease Control (May 11, 2009), 
https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/2009/peanut-butter-2008-2009.html.
30  See How Peanuts Grow, Nat’l Peanut Board, http://www.nationalpeanutboard. 
org/peanut-info/how-peanuts-grow.htm (“Unlike most plants, the peanut plant 
flowers above the ground, but fruits below ground.”) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018); 
see also K. Annabelle Smith, Why Peanut Butter is the Perfect Home for 
Salmonella, Smithsonian, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-peanut-
butter-is-the-perfect-home-for-salmonella-149834812/ (explaining that because 
peanuts grow on the ground, they “can be contaminated from a variety of sources: 
manure, water, wild animals—even the soil.”).
31  Elizabeth Weise, Peanut Butter Probe Expands; Kellogg Recalls Products, ABC 




many peanuts in its facility, so contamination on one peanut could 
easily be spread to other peanuts, especially if equipment was not 
sanitized after each lot of product produced (which, in PCA’s case, it 
was not). 
These facts — which are not in themselves FDCA violations 
— combined together allowed the following potentially dangerous 
food safety conditions: (1) initial contamination of the peanuts was 
possible before harvest because of the peanuts’ contact with soil, water 
and rodents;32 (2) cross-contamination in the facility was almost 
assured because the peanuts were mixed together and blended into 
pastes and butter;33 and (3) because much of the product was sold to 
entities making product for schools, the sick, and the elderly,34 there 
was a greater possibility for more severe illnesses. Like the DeCosters, 
however, the Parnells ignored these heightened risks and did the exact 
opposite of what they should have done: they created conditions that 
led to a widespread outbreak of foodborne illness. 
Beyond these conditions, the Parnells’ negligence also 
included: (1) failing to fix leaky roofs that allowed potentially 
contaminated water to enter production facilities;35 (2) failing to 
validate roasting conditions to properly conduct the bacteria kill step;36 
(3) failing to ensure adequate pest control, allowing for rodents and
other pests to enter the facility and spread disease;37 (4) failing to use
proper cleaning devices and failing to sanitize equipment;38 and (5)
leaving product uncovered in facilities, among other regulatory
misconduct.39
32  Smith, supra note 30. 
33  See Christine Lagorio, FDA Pumps Up Peanut Investigation, CBS News (Jan. 21, 
2009), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fda-pumps-up-peanut-investigation/.
34  Weise, supra note 31.
35  Paul Leighton, Mass Salmonella Poisoning by the Peanut Corporation of 
America: State-Corporate Crime Involving Food Safety, 24 Critical Criminology 
75, 79 (July 9, 2015), http://www.paulsjusticepage.com/library/PeanutCorp-
MassSalmonellaPoisoning.pdf.
36  Id. at 80.
37  Id.
38  U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Serv., Inspectional Observation 2 (2009), 
https://www.marlerblog.com/uploads/file/Blakely%20GA%20Form%20483.pdf.
39  Id. at 3.
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PCA and the Parnells also engaged in a cover-up conspiracy 
that prolonged the outbreak and prevented customers and the 
government from taking action to halt its spread.40 The cover-up 
included: (1) instructing company employees to ship product before 
the Salmonella test results were received by the company;41 (2) 
knowingly shipping Salmonella tainted peanut product to customers;42 
(3) shipping numerous lots of peanut product with falsified certificates 
of analysis so customers believed they were receiving product that met 
their microbial specifications when, in fact, they were not;43 (4) failing 
to inform customers of positive test results received after the product 
had shipped;44 (5) shipping product without conducting any microbial 
testing at all, yet representing that testing had been completed;45
(6) re-testing a product that had tested positive for Salmonella until 
that product tested negative, then shipping the product with only 
the negative test report;46 and (7) continuing to produce product in a 
plant that PCA knew had produced contaminated product every year 
dating back to 2003.47 Given this background, it is easy to see how the 
Parnells earned their prison sentences.
Another cautionary tale involves Jensen Farms. The Jensen 
Brothers, owners and operators of Jensen Farms, set the record for the 
deadliest foodborne illness outbreak in the U.S. since the early 1900s.48 
Not an easy feat. All told 33 people died and approximately 150 were 
sickened from eating cantaloupe tainted with Listeria monocytogenes
40  See Basu, supra note 27. 
41  Gardiner Harris, Peanut Products Sent Out Before Tests, New York Times (Feb. 11, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/policy/12peanut.html.
42  United States v. Parnell, 723 F. App’x 745, 747 (11th Cir. 2018).
43  Id. 
44   Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id.
47  Feds: Peanut plant linked to deadly outbreak faked salmonella results, CBS News 
(Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-peanut-plant-linked-to-deadly-
outbreak-faked-salmonella-results/.
48 Dan Flynn, The 10 Deadliest Outbreaks in U.S. History — Revisited, Food 




produced and sold by the Jensens in late 2011.49 Listeria is one 
of the most virulent foodborne pathogens and is particularly 
dangerous for the immune-compromised and developing fetuses.50 
According to the CDC, the fatality rate for people who develop 
listeriosis as a result of infection with Listeria is 21%.51 
What caused this cantaloupe outbreak? Listeria bacteria 
is found in soil, water, and some animals.52 Cantaloupes are more 
susceptible to Listeria  contamination than fruits growing off the 
ground because they grow on the ground and have significant contact 
with soil and water.53 Listeria can also live in processing plants, as 
a resident bacteria.54 The Jensens failed to take this heightened risk 
into account by not properly preparing their packing and storage 
facilities to address potential contamination. The primary culprit in 
spreading the Listeria bacteria was one piece of equipment — a used 
potato washing machine bought immediately before the outbreak.55 It 
was not thoroughly cleaned and thus harbored the Listeria bacteria.56 
Further, the manner in which the cantaloupes were cooled, stored, and 
transported after harvest may have contributed to the Listeria growth.57 
The Jensens were convicted of the same crime as the DeCosters, but 
49  Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes from Jensen Farms, 
Colorado (FINAL UPDATE), Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention (Aug. 27, 
2012), https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/index.html. 
50  See generally Listeria (Listeriosis), Ctr. for Disease Control and 
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/ (providing information on Listeria and how 
the illness it causes, listeriosis, affects the United States’ population) (last updated June 
29, 2017) .
51 Samson P. Baba, DDS, et al., Vital Signs: Listeria Illnesses, Deaths, and Outbreaks 
— United States, 2009–2011, 62 Ctr. for Disease Control Morbidity and Mortality 
Wkly. Rep. 432, 448–49 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6222.pdf.
52  U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Listeria, FoodSafety.gov, https://
www.foodsafety.gov/poisoning/causes/bacteriaviruses/listeria/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Listeria—DHHS]. 
53  Produce Indus. Food Safety Initiative, Commodity Specific Food Safety 
Guidelines for the Melon Supply Chain 4 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
food/guidanceregulation/ucm168625.pdf.
54  Listeria—DHHS, supra note 52. 
55  Eric And Ryan Jensen Plead Guilty To All Counts Of Introducing Tainted Cantaloupe 
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for clearly less egregious conduct.58 The Jensens were ordered to pay 
restitution, perform community service, were sentenced to five years’ 
probation and six months home detention.59  
The lessons 
What are the lessons corporate officers can learn from these 
cases? The primary point, according to the foremost expert in food 
safety litigation, Bill Marler, is: “there was always an opportunity to 
fix the problem before it blew up.”60 This is true in all of the 
outbreaks explored in this article and likely true of every other major 
foodborne illness outbreak in the United States. The lesson should be to 
have a food safety system in place for finding and maximizing on 
those opportunities. On a more microscopic level, the primary lessons 
from these criminal cases are fairly obvious:
● Don’t engage in fraudulent conduct (e.g., falsifying testing 
reports or changing production date stamps) and don’t tacitly
encourages others to do so.
● Don't knowingly ship or sell contaminated product.
● Don’t bribe or otherwise attempt to manipulate regulators.
● Don’t create conditions that foster spread of disease by, for
example, storing product in open containers or allowing rodents
and other vermin easy access to your facility.
● Create, and then follow, a FSMA-compliant food safety plan.
● Immediately fix a food safety violation when you uncover it.
58  Compare Plea Agreement for Eric Jensen, United States. v. Jensen, No. 13-
mj-01138 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2013) (finding Eric and Ryan Jensen knowingly 
distributed adulterated cantelope in interstate commerce), with United States v. 
DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016) (showing Mr. Decoster plead guilty to: (1) 
bribing a USDA inspector, (2) intentionally introducing misbranded eggs into 
interstate commerce, and (3) introducing adulterated eggs into commerce).   
59  Mary Beth Marklein, Cantelope farmers get no prison time in disease outbreak, 
USA Today (Jan. 28, 2014), https://usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/28/
sentencing-of-colorado-cantaloupe-farmers/4958671/.
60  Bill Marler, Managing Partner, Marler Clark, Lecture in Food Safety Litigation 
Course at the Univ. of Ark. Sch. of Law (Spring 2017).
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However, these measures are no-brainers and things your 
company is hopefully already doing. So what else can we discern from 
these cases about foodborne illness prevention that is not immediately 
obvious and may help create a more meaningful food safety program? 
Here are some ideas:
1. Create a food safety first culture. A food safety first
culturecan make all the difference in preventing or lessening the 
severity of an outbreak. Food safety was not part of PCA’s company 
culture. Employees were routinely instructed to ship contaminated 
product and to “just ship” product without receiving test results 
because the Parnells did not want to lose a customer.61 The Parnells 
maintained a company-wide culture of indifference and indignation to 
food safety measures.62 In contrast to the Parnells, food companies 
should ensure the company culture has a strong, primary focus on 
food safety which includes ensuring all employees feel comfortable 
reporting potential food safety violations, no matter how trivial they 
may appear. Companies should consider incentives and rewards for 
employees who identify and fix food safety errors. Moreover, 
company policy should instruct that each employee is responsible for, 
and must take ownership of, the safety of all food products under his 
or her control. Management should likewise take responsibility for, 
and ownership of, food safety products under control of his or her 
subordinates. Food safety should be a source of company and 
employee pride. 
2. Do not ignore your own internal food safety research. The
1993 Jack-in-the-Box E-coli outbreak could have been prevented if 
the company had simply followed the advice and research of its own 
employees.63 In that case, internal studies showed that increasing 
cooking time by a couple of minutes would have reduced the 
61  Answering Brief of the United States at 18, United States v. Parnell, 723 F. Appx. 
745 (2018) (No. 15-14400), 2017 WL 780905 at 18.
62  Id. at 13.
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E- coli colonies in burgers sufficient to ensure they could be safety
consumed.64 Jack-in-the-Box management ignored one employee’s
suggestion to increase cook time and, instead, reminded the employee
of the obligation to follow the existing company cooking-time
policies.65 Had they taken up the suggestion instead, the outbreak
could have been prevented.
3. Have measurable and meaningful pathogen-reduction goals.
In ready-to-eat foods, the goal for positive pathogen testing should, of 
course, be zero. Likewise, for per-se adulterants (e.g., E-coli 
0157:H7), zero tolerance is the measure.66 However, where the USDA 
or FDA has not declared a pathogen a per se adulterant, companies 
should set strict and challenging microbial level goals. For example, 
Wal-Mart has undertaken significant efforts to reduce the presence of 
Salmonella in its raw chicken by placing strict pathogen requirements 
on its chicken parts suppliers.67 Wal-Mart has also implemented 
a testing regime for the raw chicken it purchases. As a result, the 
company has had a significant decrease in Salmonella presence in its 
raw chicken.68 
4. Know where your skeletons are. That is, understand the
risks most likely associated with your product and create — then 
follow — an individual risk mitigation plan for those specific risks. 
There are some food products that commonly carry pathogens;
63   Elaine Porterfield & Adam Berliant, Jack in the Box Ignored Safety Rules, News 
Tribune (Takoma, WA) (June 16, 1995), https://about-ecoli.com/ecoli_outbreaks/
news/jack-in-the-box-ignored-safety-rules. 
64  Id. 
65  See id. (noting the company’s answer to an employee’s concern about undercooked 
burgers, which stated that “if patties are cooked longer, they become tough.”).
66  See Texas Food Indus. Ass’n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1994) 
(affirming declaration of e-coli of a per se adulterant in raw ground beef under the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act).
67  See Walmart, Food Safety Requirement for Food and Beverage Suppliers 
12–13 (2017), https://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/3d/b3/f30fc5f44fc58ea06cec84102c26/
supplier-food-safety-requirements-2017-v2.pdf (outlining food safety procedures for 
poultry suppliers).
68  Coral Beach, Wal-Mart’s chicken safety program shows significant results, Food 
Safety News (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/08/130453/.
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poultry is known to carry Salmonella bacteria,69 beef is known to carry 
E-coli bacteria,70 and ready-to-eat deli meat is known to carry Listeria
bacteria.71 Companies selling these products, therefore, should test for
these pathogens and create a pathogen-reduction and control program
specific to those risks as a part of FSMA compliance. For example,
given the 2017 widespread outbreak of E-coli illness from romaine
lettuce grown near Yuma, AZ, food companies planning
to source produce from that region should take caution to protect
against contamination. The outbreak was traced to an irrigation ditch
downstream from a concentrated cattle feeding operation and upstream
from the romaine fields; the source of the E-coli, therefore, may still
be lingering upstream from the produce fields.72
5. Invest in traceability measures and consider blockchain
technology. Food giants like Wal-Mart view blockchain technology as 
the answer to stopping or slowing down food-related pathogen 
outbreaks.73 Regulations require a one-forward, one-back traceability 
system, but as we saw in the recent E.coli outbreak, this approach may 
not be sufficient to initiate a product recall or swiftly trace the source 
of the pathogen. It took months for the CDC and FDA to 
69  Chicken and food poisoning, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://
www.cdc.gov/features/salmonellachicken/index.html (noting that “Chicken can be a 
nutritious choice, but raw chicken is often contaminated with Campylobacter bacteria 
and sometimes with Salmonella and Clostridium perfringens bacteria”) (last updated 
Sept. 20, 2018).
70  U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, E-coli, FoodSafety.Gov, https://www. 
foodsafety.gov/poisoning/causes/bacteriaviruses/ecoli/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2018). 
71  Listeria, supra note 51.
72  U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, FDA Investigating Multistate Outbreak 
of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Linked to Romaine Lettuce from Yuma Growing 
Region, U.S. Food and Drug Admin (Aug. 6, 2018),  https://www.fda.gov/
food/recallsoutbreaksemergencies/outbreaks/ucm604254.htm.
73  Camila Russo, Walmart Is Getting Suppliers to Put Food on the Blockchain, 
Bloomberg (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-04-23/walmart-is-getting-suppliers-to-put-food-on-blockchain-to-track.
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trace the tainted romaine lettuce back to a grower.74 In the meantime, 
grocery stores were pulling all romaine products off their shelves and 
consumers were avoiding consumption of any and all romaine 
lettuce.75 The outbreak could have ended sooner and companies could 
have wasted fewer resources had the supply chain been better 
documented through blockchain or other technology. Blockchain 
technology can assist with more than traceability, it can also help 
companies identify any weakness in their supply chain since it can be 
used to automatically track temperatures, shipment dates, delivery 
dates, currency of safety certificates, and other information critical to 
maintaining a safe and secure supply chain.76 As part of your 
traceability program, conduct mock recalls and audits to ensure your 
traceability system will function if necessary.
6. Take immediate action to notify customers of a recall.
In other words, don’t wait until the close of markets on a Friday 
afternoon to notify your retailers of a recall. This common practice is a 
dead giveaway you are putting profits ahead of food safety and may 
ruin your relationships with business partners. 
7. Overtrain employees on food safety and do it in their native
language. Research shows people only retain 20% of what they hear.77 
Repetition can significantly increase this number, so employees must 
be trained and trained again (critically, in their native language) on 
proper food safety measures. 
74  Julia Jacobs, Officials Identify a Source in the Roamine Lettuce E. Coli Outbreak, 
N.Y. Times (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/us/romaine-
lettuce-e-coli-nyt.html. 
75  Jesse Hirsch, Stores Pulling Romaine Lettuce Off Shelves Amid E. Coli Outbreak, 
Consumer reports (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/e-coli/stores-
pulling-romaine-lettuce-off-shelves-amid-e-coli-outbreak/.
76  Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform The Supply Chain And 
Logistics Industry, Forbes (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-
logistics-industry/#6de4d315fecd.
77  Will Thalheimer, Debunk This: People Remember 10 Percent of What They Read, 
Ass’n for Talent Dev. (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.td.org/insights/debunk-this-
people-remember-10-percent-of-what-they-read.
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Conclusions
In sum, following a food safety plan is essential to achieve 
food safety goals, prevent widespread and lingering outbreaks, ensure 
regulatory compliance, and avoid incarceration. Going one step further 
and engaging employees, creating a healthy food safety culture, and 
installing numerous check points can create brand loyalty, customer 
loyalty, and hopefully prevent any illness from occurring at all. Simply 
put, if food companies put food safety first, the results will follow. 
Super Unleaded Malbec? A Case Study in Flawed 
International Standard Setting at the Codex Alimentarius
Justin Schwegel*
I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) provides rules on the adoption and enforcement of SPS 
measures. It also presumes that food safety regulations adopted by 
WTO Members that conform to relevant international standards are 
consistent with the SPS Agreement.1 The relevant international 
standard setting body for food safety is the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, which conducts most of its food safety risk 
management work through subsidiary bodies such as the Codex 
Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF). CCCF establishes 
maximum limits for food contaminants and codes of practice for 
reducing food contamination.2 These subsidiary bodies in turn 
delegate risk management work to electronic working groups 
(EWG that are comprised of relevant food safety authorities of Codex 
member states.3
One contaminant of concern is lead. Lead exposure from 
dietary sources is harmful to human health, and especially harmful to 
children.4 In March 2018, the CCCF Electronic Working Group (EWG) 
*Justin Schwegel holds law degrees from Georgetown University Law Center and
Sciences Po Paris and is a 2019 candidate in the University of Arkansas’s Agriculture
and Food Law LL.M. Program.  He specializes in international trade, food safety and
economic development.
1Agreement on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3.2, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
2  Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Procedural Manual, Twenty-Fourth Edition, at 192
(2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5079e.pdf [hereinafter Codex Manual].
3  Id. at 109–11.
4  Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Evaluation of Certain
Food Additives and Contaminants, Seventy-Third Report, WHO Technical Report
Series 960, at 176 (2010), http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44515 [hereinafter
Evaluation].
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to Revise the Maximum Levels (ML) for Lead proposed to reduce the 
ML for lead in wine from .2 parts per million (ppm)5 to .05 ppm.6 
The EWG ostensibly based this proposal on the “ALARA” principle, 
which dictates that standards for dangerous contaminants should be 
set at a level “as low as reasonably achievable.”7 The EWG applies 
the same methodology when establishing MLs for relatively low-
value products often consumed by children, the group most vulnerable 
to lead exposure.8 Another EWG is currently charged with 
prioritizing commodities to establish new lead MLs in the General 
Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed.9  Some 
commodities under consideration include high value, age-restricted 
products like cognac and absinthe.10 Establishing MLs for alcoholic 
beverages using the methodology applied to products marketed for 
child consumption is inappropriate. It could also distract from the 
important work of progressively reducing lead in products commonly 
consumed by those most vulnerable to lead exposure, where 
reductions in lead provide greater public health benefit for the same 
economic cost. 
II. The GATT, the WTO, and the Internationalization of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards
5  Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Codex General Standard for Contaminants 
and Toxins in Food and Feed, Codex Standard 193-1995, at 46 (2018), www.fao.org/
input/download/standards/17/CXS_193e_2015.pdf.
6 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft and Draft Maximum Levels of Lead in 
Selected Commodities in the General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and 




7  Id. at 8.
8  See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., supra note 6, at 8. 
9  Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Discussion Paper on Future Work on Maximum Levels 
for Lead for Inclusion in the General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food 
and Feed, CX/CF 18/12/14 (2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-
proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252 
Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_14e.pdf [hereinafter 
Codex Discussion Paper]. 
10  Id. at 29.
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A. The Need for International Standard Setting Bodies
The WTO Members negotiated greater trade liberalization
at the Uruguay Round, particularly for agricultural commodities.11 
The SPS Agreement was designed to help ensure this trade 
liberalization was not undermined by unnecessarily restrictive SPS 
measures.12 An SPS measure under the terms of the SPS Agreement 
is any measure adopted to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health from disease, or unsafe food and feed.13  While necessary to 
protect both human health and the security of the food supply, such 
measures can also be applied in such a way as to function as nontariff 
barriers to trade in agricultural products.14
Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures were only subject to Article XX 
(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT.15 GATT
Article XX(b provides general exceptions for the application of
potentially trade-restrictive measures “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health.”16 This proved an ineffective
regulatory structure.17 It neither effectively disciplined protectionist
SPS measures nor sufficiently recognized Members’ sovereign right
11  See Boris Rigod, The Purpose of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503, 507 (2013).
12  Id.; see also Marie Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension 481–82 (2009) (discussing the purpose 
behind the Uruguay Round negotiations of the SPS Agreement and trade disputes 
concerning market access barriers to agricultural products).
13  SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at Annex A1.
14  See Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) and Related Non-Tariff Barriers to Agricultural Trade 22, 33 (2014) 
(discussing concerns from agricultural exporters and policy makers that SPS measures 
act as nontariff barriers).
15  While the 1979 GATT “Standards Code” applied among states that ratified it, it 
was not generally applicable to all GATT members. Additionally, its substantive and 
procedural deficiencies rendered it ineffective even for states party to the agreement. 
See Prévost, supra note 12, at 470-481 (discussing numerous shortcomings of the 
“Standards Code”).
16  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 [hereinafter GATT]; see also, Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶147–51, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (explaining that measures adopted 
under the specific exceptions enumerated under GATT Article XX must also comply 
with the language of the chapeau).
17  See Prévost, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the lack of enforceability of the art. 
XX(b) exceptions).
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to adopt legitimate SPS measures.18 Additionally, under GATT Article 
XX, WTO Members were not obligated to avoid arbitrarily applying 
different levels of sanitary and phytosanitary protection in comparable 
situations.19
The myriad insufficiencies of the existing framework governing 
the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures led GATT 
negotiators to begin negotiating an agreement that would explicitly 
articulate contracting parties’ right to adopt legitimate SPS measures 
and subject such measures to strict disciplines to avoid protectionism.20
Namely, they must be based on a scientific assessment of risk or the 
relevant international standard.21 The SPS Agreement cites three 
international standard setting bodies of reference, including the Codex 
Alimentarius mentioned above.22 The World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC 
are the relevant international standard setting bodies for animal health 
and plant health respectively.23 
When WTO Members adopt uniform international SPS 
standards it reduces the cost of regulatory compliance for exporters.24 
This facilitates international trade.25 Codex, IPPC and OIE are open to 
membership from WTO Members and were perceived at the time of 
negotiations to establish standards on a sound scientific basis by the 
parties negotiating the text of the SPS Agreement.26 As a result, the 
negotiating parties supported deference to the standards promulgated 
18  Id. 
19  Id.; but see SPS Agreement, art. 5(5) (containing such an obligation). 
20  SPS Agreement, supra note 1; See also, Rigod, supra note 11, at 507.
21  SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3, art. 5.
22  Id. at Annex A(3).
23  Id. at Annex A(3)(b), (c).
24  See Prévost, supra note 12, at 317.
25  See e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., supra note 2, at 21. 
26  See e.g., Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Communication from Israel Expressing 
Views on Certain Elements in the Negotiation on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/153, at 
5 (Feb. 13, 1990) (stressing the importance of science based standards and 
supporting the adoption of standards developed in the international standard setting 
bodies as guidelines for an effective surveillance and dispute settlement procedure in 
GATT), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CGNGNG05%5CW153.PDF; WTO 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Supplementary Communication from the Cairns 




by these bodies.27 This deference creates a presumption that an 
SPS measure that complies with the relevant international standard 
also complies with the SPS Agreement and Article XX(b) of the 
GATT.28  Early proposals by negotiating parties such as the United 
States and the Cairns group suggested that SPS measures conforming 
to international standards should be “deemed” consistent with 
WTO obligations rather than deemed necessary and “presumed” 
consistent.29 While a presumption of consistency can be rebutted, it 
seems unlikely a measure “deemed” consistent with the SPS 
Agreement could be shown to be nonetheless inconsistent.30
B. The Use of Codex Standards
WTO Members have several incentives to adopt 
international standards. Because many developing WTO Members 
lack the capacity to conduct risk assessments of their own they often 
defer to Codex’s food safety standards.31 This is often done 
through regulations that either explicitly defer to Codex or 
mirror Codex standards.32 Additionally, because the SPS 
Agreement presumes measures that conform to international 
standards are consistent with the Agreement there is a safe harbor 
27  Id.
28 See SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3(2) (“Sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations 
shall be . . . presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement and of GATT 1994.”). 
29 Negotiating Group on Agriculture, supra note 26; Negotiating Group on 
Agriculture, Submission of the United States on Comprehensive Long-Term 
Agriculture Reform, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/118, at 12 (Oct. 25, 1989), 
https:www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92080128.pdf.
30 While beyond the scope of this article, the negotiating history eschewing 
an irrebuttable presumption of WTO consistency in favor of presumed 
consistency does not provide great clarity as to when a measure adopted by a 
WTO Member in accordance with an international standard can nonetheless be 
deemed WTO inconsistent. Likely, the adoption of international standards that fail to 
comply with the requirement to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
applying an appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in different 
situations under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement could be considered arbitrary and 
unjustifiable under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and the chapeau of 
GATT Article XX.
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for regulations harmonized with the international standard.33 WTO 
Members are less likely to challenge SPS measures that are 
consistent with international standards because of the greater burden 
of overcoming the presumed consistency.34 Because of this safe 
harbor, many WTO Members either defer to the Codex when there is 
no domestic standard (as Morocco does for veterinary drug residues, for 
example)35 or allow imports that comply with international standards 
notwithstanding a more restrictive domestic standard (as South Africa 
does for pesticide residues, for example).36
Due to the widespread adoption of Codex standards and the 
deference they are given under the SPS Agreement, their importance 
for international trade is difficult to overstate. Consequently, the 
potential for negative economic impacts from overly restrictive Codex 
standards has been a real concern for many agricultural producers in the 
past.37 The Codex Alimentarius Committee on Contaminants in Food 
(CCCF) is the Codex committee responsible for establishing MLs for 
33  SPS Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 3(2).
34  See Standards and Safety, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
35  Aziz AKHANNOUCH & Anass DOUKKALI, “Arrêté du ministre de la santé n
°2454-17 du 3 joumada II 1439 (20 février 2018) fixant les limites 
maximales autorisées de résidus des produits pharmaceutiques dans les produits 
primaires et les produits alimentaires,” Bulletin Officiel, 2018, no. 6666, p. 1029, 
http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/FR/2018/BO_6666_Fr.pdfver=2018-04-27-113812-017, 
translated in GLOB. AGRIC. INFO. NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
GAIN REP. NO. MO1826, MOROCCO, VETERINARY DRUG MRLS 
ESTABLISHED, 2 (2018), https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%
20Publications/Veterinary%20Drug%20MRLs%20 
Established_Rabat_Morocco_6-6-2018.pdf (deferring to Codex Alimentarius 
maximum residue limits (MRL) for veterinary drugs when no domestic 
MRL has been established).
36  Dep’t of Nat’l Health & Population Dev., Regulations Governing the Maximum 
Limits for Pesticide Residues That May Be Present in Foodstuffs, GN R.246 of 11 
February 1994, at 2(d) (11 Feb 1994), https://www.nda.agric.za/docs/PlantQuality/
quality%20control/MRLs%20Dept%20of%20Health%20-%20R246%20of%20 11%
20Feb%201994.pdf (allowing the import of foodstuffs that comply with Codex 
Alimentarius standards for pesticides).  
37  See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft Maximum Level for Aflatoxins 
in Ready-to-Eat Peanuts and Associated Sampling Plans (at Step 4), CX/CF 18/12/10-
Add.1, at 2-4, (Mar. 12-16, 2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/ 
sh-proxy/pt/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%
252Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_10_Add1e.pdf 
(noting the United States and the International Council of Grocery Manufacturers 
Associations concerns that an overly restrictive ML for aflatoxins in ready-to-eat 
peanuts would cause potentially significant problems with international trade).
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contaminants, such as lead, in food and beverages.38
Several wine producing countries have likewise expressed 
concern about the low ML for lead in wine proposed by CCCF’s EWG 
to revise MLs for lead.39
III. The Health Concern over Lead Exposure and the Codex
Response
Exposure to lead from food is harmful to everyone, but it 
is disproportionately harmful to children.40 As a result of a 2010 
study on lead exposure, a new Codex electronic working group was 
established to reconsider international standards regarding maximum 
levels of lead allowed in food products, especially for products 
consumed by children.41 EWGs are subject to the Codex guidelines 
on risk management recommendations.42 These guidelines require risk 
management recommendations to be based on an approach that weighs 
the economic cost against the public health benefit.43 
A. The Special Vulnerability of Children to Lead Exposure
In 2010, the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food 
Additives (JECFA) held its 73rd meeting to evaluate certain food 
additives and contaminants.44 The JECFA meeting report cited concerns 
38  Codex Manuel, supra note 2, at 192.
39  See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft and Draft Maximum Levels 
of Lead in Selected Commodities in the General Standard for Contaminants and 
Toxins in Food and Feed (CXS 193-1995) (at Steps 7 and 4), CX/CF 18/12/5-Add.1, at 
1-7 (March 12–16, 2018),  http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/
en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcod ex
%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_05_Add1e.pdf (noting
comments from Argentina, Australia, Japan, and Turkey that show such concern).
40  Evaluation, supra note 4, at 176.
41  Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Rep. of the Fifth Session of the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods, REP11/CF, at 15 (2011), www.fao.org/input/download/
report/758/REP11_CFe.pdf.
42  Codex Manuel, supra note 2, at 129.
43  See id. at 128 (noting that the CCCF shall consider, among other factors, protection 
of consumer health and the impact on international trade when preparing its priority 
list of substances for review).
44   Evaluation, supra note 4. 
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over lead exposure and noted it was impossible to establish a tolerable 
weekly intake for lead that would be health protective.45 Essentially, 
JECFA found that no level of lead exposure is safe. JECFA noted, “[b]
ecause of the neurodevelopmental effects, fetuses, infants and children 
are the subgroups that are most sensitive to lead.”46 While they are the 
most vulnerable, children are not the only group at risk of harmful 
health impacts from dietary exposure to lead. The greatest concern from 
lead exposure for adults is an associated risk of increased systolic blood 
pressure, though JECFA has found this concern is not as significant as 
the concern for the neurodevelopmental impact on children.47 JECFA 
also noted: 
impaired neurodevelopment in children is generally 
associated with lower blood lead concentrations than the other 
effects, the weight of evidence is greater for neurodevelopmental 
effects than for other health effects and the results across studies 
are more consistent than those for other effects.48 
JECFA’s case for reducing children’s dietary exposure to lead 
was strong. As a result of the JECFA report, the Codex Alimentarius 
Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF) established an electronic 
working group to reconsider the existing lead maximum levels with a 
focus on reducing dietary exposure to lead, especially for infants and 
children.49 
The discussion paper presented at the following CCCF meeting 
by the EWG stressed the importance of “whether children were 
high consumers of the food or had significant lead exposure from the 
food, since lead is of particular concern for children.”50
45  Id. at 176.
46  Id. at 481.
47  Id. at 480.
48  Id.
49 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
REP12/CF, at ¶ 116 (Mar.26-30,2012),http://www.fao.org/input/download/
report/776/REP12_CFe.pdf (stating that the EWG was established to “(i) 
reconsider the existing maximum levels with a focus on foods important for infants 
and children and also on the canned fruits and vegetables and (ii) reconsider if other 
existing maximum levels should be addressed”).
50  Id. at ¶ 116 (stressing throughout the discussion paper the importance of the rate 
at which children consume various foods and the relative additional protection a 




Concerns over the dietary exposure of children and fetuses to 
lead were a primary reason the EWG was established.51 The EWG’s 
original mandate to “focus on foods important for infants and children” 
reflects CCCF’s u nderstanding o f t he r elative r isks f or different 
population groups.52 By committing to prioritize lead MLs for foods 
consumed by the most vulnerable group in its early reconsideration of 
MLs in the General Standard, CCCF recognized the greater relative risk 
to children from dietary lead exposure identified in the JECFA report. 
B. Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Codex Guidelines, and
the Inherent Need for Proportionality
Under the Codex Alimentarius Working Principles there is a 
clear distinction between the competences of the body charged with risk 
assessment, the FAO/WHO joint expert bodies, and the body charged 
with risk management, the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its 
subsidiary bodies.53 For contaminants it is JECFA’s responsibility 
to assess risk, while CCCF is the subsidiary Codex risk 
management body.54
When managing risk through the propagation of 
international standards, Codex has the dual mandate of 
“protecting consumers’ health and ensuring fair practices in the 
food trade.”55 The dual mandate reflects the language of the 
original 1961 FAO resolution calling for the establishment of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, which recognized the importance 
of international food standards for “protecting consumer[s] and 
producer[s] in all countries.”56 The need to balance the economic 
costs of disrupted trade with the anticipated public health benefits of
51  See Report of the Fifth Session of the Codex on Contaminants in Foods, REP11/CF, 
at 15, Joint FAO/WHO (2011) (stating that the EWG was established to “(i) 
reconsider the existing maximum levels with a focus on foods important for infants 
and children and also on the canned fruits and vegetables and (ii) reconsider if 
other existing maximum levels should be addressed.”).
52  Id.
53  See Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 126–29. 
54  See id. at 127.
55  Id. at 116. 
56  See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n. Res. 12/61 (Nov. 4–24, 1961) (creating the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission generally, and including reasons for its creation).
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a given food safety standard is not unique to Codex; it is inherent in 
any food regulatory system.57 
The relevant Codex risk management body for contaminants 
in food is CCCF.58 The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s Procedural 
Manual establishes guidelines for how CCCF is to make its risk 
management recommendations.59 There are three guidelines in the 
Procedural Manual that are especially relevant to the consideration of 
MLs for lead in different commodities. The recommendations must 
be based on the JECFA risk assessments, they must take 
different consumption patterns and dietary exposures into account, 
and they must be based on principles established in the Codex 
General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed.60
With respect to the first guideline, JECFA assessed the risk 
posed by lead.61 It recommended that in populations with prolonged 
dietary exposures the relevant food safety authorities should take 
measures “to identify major contributing sources and foods and…
to identify methods of reducing dietary exposure commensurate with 
the level of risk reduction [emphasis added].”62 The recommendation 
to pursue means of reducing dietary exposure commensurate with risk 
reduction reflects the balancing of economic costs and public health 
benefits inherent in food safety regulation. Put differently, the EWG 
should ensure the public health benefit of the end justifies the 
economic cost of the means.63
The Codex guideline requiring that different consumption 
patterns and dietary exposures be taken into account is important for 
determining the expected health benefit of a food safety standard.64
57  See generally Jᴇᴀɴ C. Bᴜᴢʙʏ, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ.,U.S Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ. Aɢʀɪᴄ., ERS, Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ 
ᴀɴᴅ Fᴏᴏᴅ Sᴀꜰᴇᴛʏ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Tʜᴇᴏʀʏ ᴀɴᴅ Cᴀsᴇ Sᴛᴜᴅɪᴇs 828, 29 (2003) (discussing the 
ineluctable necessity to balance economic interests with food safety concerns).
58  Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 192.
59  Id. at 129–30.
60  Id.
61  Evaluation, supra note 4, at 162–77.
62  Id. at 177.
63  See generally Bᴜᴢʙʏ, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 57 (discussing the balance of food safety and
economic concerns in food safety policy making).
64 See generally Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 132–35 (describing in detail the 
CCCF policy for conducting exposure assessments of contaminants and toxins in food 
or food groups). 
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If the most vulnerable populations will not ordinarily be exposed to 
lead from alcoholic beverages this should be taken into account when 
assessing the public health benefit of a new ML. Early work of the 
EWG seems to have taken this into account as many of the commodities 
reviewed by the committee in its nascence reflect a focus on infants and 
young children, including fruit juices, milk, and infant formula.65 
The EWG ostensibly implements the final guideline that new 
lead ML recommendations be based on principles established in the 
Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and 
Feed. The document proposing new proposed draft MLs for lead in 
selected commodities prepared for CCCF’s 2018 meeting specifically 
invoked the principle of establishing MLs based on levels that are as low 
as reasonably achievable (ALARA).66 The same principle is outlined 
in the General Standard.67 However, the principle that contaminants in 
food should be as low as reasonably achievable is itself a balancing 
test requiring an assessment of the economic cost and the public health 
benefit of further reducing MLs.68
C. The Appropriate Application of ALARA
The correct application of ALARA means any recommended 
65  Codex Draft, supra note 6 (recommending stricter lead MLs for fruit juices, milk, 
infant formula, canned fruits and vegetables, and cereal grains).
66  Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 8.
67  Codex Alimentarius, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that “[c]ontaminant levels in food 
and feed shall be as low as reasonably achievable through best practice such as Good 
Agricultural Practice . . . and Good Manufacturing Practice . . .”).
68  WHO & FAO, Food Safety Risk Analysis: A guide for national food safety 
authorities, 87 FAO Food and Nutrition Paper, 2006, at 1, 31 (defining ALARA 
as an approach to risk management that aims for the lowest level of risk “technically 
possible and/or economically feasible under the circumstances. Some residual risk to 
consumer typically remains; for example for . . . environmental contaminants in 
otherwise wholesome foods.”); see also, Frédéric Bouder et al., The Tolerability of 
Risk A New Framework for Risk Management  120 (Ragnar E. Löfstedt ed., 
Earthscan 2007) (defining ALARA as a weighing of risk versus cost feasibility 
criteria); G.H. Eduljee, Trends in Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 249 
The Science of the Total Environment 13, 19 (2000) (explaining that what 
constitutes “reasonableness” in an ALARA approach “necessarily accommodates a 
range of criteria covering human health, well being of the ecosystem, economic and 
social factors, as well as the concept of fairness”); Commission Regulation 2006, 
O.J. (L 364) ℙ 3–4 (EC) (endorsing both the ALARA principle and the principle of 
proportionality). 
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ML should be technically possible and economically feasible and 
should take into account the health benefit and economic impact.69 The 
recommendation that measures should be commensurate with the public 
health benefit in the JECFA report, the obligation to take into account 
different consumption patterns in the Codex Procedural Manual, and 
the correct application of the ALARA principle identified in the General 
Standard all call for an approach that balances economic cost with 
public health benefit. For alcoholic beverages, which are age restricted, 
the public health benefit of stricter standards is weaker. For high value 
products such as wine and spirits, the economic cost is greater. 
1. Expected public health benefit is reduced for lead reductions in
alcoholic beverages 
The most vulnerable populations are already not exposed to 
lead from alcoholic beverages because they are age restricted. 
Consequently, the methodology the EWG uses for proposing draft MLs 
does not clearly reflect JECFA’s recommendation or the ALARA 
principle, and does not seem to take into account consumption patterns. 
The EWG has: 
no specific rule to identify the appropriate cut-off 
value [for MLs], but in general, [its] approach has been to 
recommend reductions in MLs when the percentage of 
excluded samples was less than 5 percent.70
 The EWG is applying the same methodology to the review of 
the wine ML71 that it applied to infant formula.72  It is unclear 
how a methodology that focuses only on the percentage of trade 
potentially disrupted without taking into account dietary exposure or 
the relative economic impact can ensure that steps taken are 
commensurate with the level of risk reduction.
69  WHO & FAO, supra note 68, at 31 (defining ALARA as an approach to risk 
management that aims for the lowest level of risk “technically possible and/or 
economically feasible under the circumstances. Some residual risk to consumer 
typically remains; for example for . . . environmental contaminants in otherwise 
wholesome foods.”); G.H. Eduljee, supra note 68, at 19.
70  Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 9.
71  Id.
72  Codex Draft, supra note 6 (stating the recommendation of the EWG for infant 
formula, which, one should note, was so lax that 99% of the available samples in the 
GEMS database would have met it). 
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Alcohol has different consumption patterns than other food 
products.73 Consumption patterns and dietary exposure should be 
considered when recommending maximum use levels for 
contaminants.74 For adults, the greatest risk from lead exposure is 
elevated systolic blood pressure.75 JECFA noted that for adults, “dietary 
exposure corresponding to an increase in systolic blood pressure of 1 
mmHg…was estimated to be 80…μg/day, or about 1.3…μg/kg bw 
[body weight] per day.”76 For children the greatest risk is 
neurodevelopmental and happens at much lower exposure levels than 
the risk for adults.77 JECFA found that in children, “the chronic dietary 
exposure corresponding to a decrease of 1 IQ point was estimated to be 
12 μg/day…[the] equivalent to 0.6 μg/kg bw per day.”78 This indicates 
that children warrant extra protection from dietary lead exposure.
With respect to a similar contamination concern, methylmercury 
levels in fish, the U.S. and Japanese Codex delegations have consistently 
opposed maximum limits that would impact international trade flows.79
The United States and Japan instead favor consumption guidance from 
national health authorities indicating the excessive consumption of fish 
of certain species can negatively harm infants, children, and pregnant 
women.80 The risk profiles of methylmercury and lead are not identical. 
However, given the myriad national laws that prohibit the consumption 
73  Priya Deshmukh-Taskar et al., Does Food Group Consumption Vary by Differences 
in Socioeconomic, Demographic, and Lifestyle Factors in young Adults? The Bogalusa 
Heart Study, 107(2) J. Am. Diabetic Assoc. 16-18 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC2769987/pdf/nihms-150941.pdf.
74  Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 129–30.
75  See Evaluation, supra note 4. 
76  Id. at 175. 
77  Id. at 176–77.
78  Id. at 175. 
79  Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft Maximum Levels for Methylmercury 
in Fish Including Associated Sampling Plans, CX/CF 18/12/7, at 5–6, 10, (2018) 
[hereinafter Codex Draft for Methylmercury in Fish]; but see Nicholas V.C. Ralston 
et al., Selenium-Health Benefit Values as Seafood Safety Criteria 433 (Se-
Kwon Kim ed., CRC Press 2014) (discussing how an outdated understanding of the 
mechanisms of methylmercury toxicity leads to bad public health policy). 
80  Codex Draft for Methylmercury in Fish, supra note 79; see generally Eating Fish: 
What Pregnant Woman and Parents Should Know, Food Drug Admin., https://www. 
fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodborneIllnessContaminants/Metals/UCM537120.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (discussing advice on eating fish and shellfish). 
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of alcoholic beverages by minors, it is unlikely that lead exposure 
from alcoholic beverages presents a significant source of dietary lead 
exposure to infants and children. 
Adults already limit alcohol consumption under the guidance 
of national health authorities.81 National guidelines also advise women 
who are pregnant or who could become pregnant not to consume 
alcohol.82 This guidance also limits dietary exposure of lead from 
alcoholic beverages to fetuses, which are also vulnerable. Any health 
benefit from reducing the ML for lead in alcoholic beverages is further 
reduced because the guidance already plays a significant role in 
reducing exposure from this source, even for adults. The same guidance 
warnings the U.S. and Japanese Codex delegations suggest for the most 
at-risk populations for methylmercury in fish are already more than 
accomplished with respect to alcohol. As a result, those most vulnerable 
to lead exposure consume a disproportionately small amount of alcohol, 
and those least vulnerable already limit their dietary exposure to lead 
from this source due to the other detrimental health impacts associated 
with the overconsumption of alcohol.
2. The same cut-off points for MLs would have a
disproportionately large economic impact on trade vis-a-vis the
relatively minor health benefit for alcoholic beverages
The relatively high unit value of alcoholic beverages, 
including wine, scotch, or cognac versus other products that are not age-
restricted also indicates a need to exercise relatively more caution when
81  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t Of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep’t Of Agric., 2015-2020 
Dietary Guidelines For Americans 34 (8th ed. 2015), https://health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_Guidelines.pdf (advising 
adults to limit alcohol consumption to “up to one drink per day for women and up to two 
drinks per day for men”) [hereinafter Dietary Guidelines For Americans];  New Alcohol 
Guidelines Launched, Dep’t of Health (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www. health-ni.gov.uk/
news/new-alcohol-guidelines-launched (recommending no more than 14 units of 
alcohol per week);  Nat’l Health & Med. Research Council, Frequently Asked Questions, 
Alcohol Harm Reduction FAQ, (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) https:// nhmrc.gov.au/
file/1646/download?token=rIVX7h5N (recommending no more than two standard drinks 
per day).
82  See, e.g., Dietary Guidelines For Americans, supra note 81, at 103 (advising that 
“women who are or who may be pregnant should not drink”); New Alcohol Guidelines 
Launched, supra note 81 (stating that “if you are pregnant or planning a pregnancy, the 
safest approach is not to drink alcohol at all, to keep risks to your baby to a 
minimum”);  Nat’l Health & Med. Research Council, supra note 81.
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drafting safety measures that may restrict trade. The ML currently 
proposed for wine is .05 ppm. This is the same ML that applied to 
grape juice until July 2018 when the ML was modified to .04 ppm, 
despite the vastly different consumer profile and consumption patterns 
for the two products.83 
The EWG’s opinion is that following the same 
methodology for alcoholic beverages, such as wine, (i.e. 
recommending MLs at a level such that less than 5% of samples in 
the GEMS database for wine would fail to meet it) as for other products 
is consistent with the ALARA principle.84 However, it is worth noting 
that while the percentage of wine in the sample that would fail to 
meet the hypothetical ML is 3.4%,85 the percentage of GEMS 
samples of infant formula with a limit of quantification that would 
have failed to meet the hypothetical ML proposed in 2013 was 
only .37%, nearly one tenth as restrictive as the proposed ML for 
wine.86 It is peculiar that a product that will be consumed 
exclusively by those least vulnerable would be subject to standards 
more restrictive than those for a product that is consumed exclusively 
by those most vulnerable. Additionally, the entire global market for 
infant formula, including infant formula domestically consumed, 
is estimated at more than $45 billion.87 Meanwhile, the global 
market for alcoholic beverages is estimated at over $1.2 trillion.88 If the 
global alcohol market contracted by 3.4%, it would equal roughly $41 
billion. 
83  FAO & WHO, Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Rep. of the 41st Session of the Codex 
Alimentarius Comm’n, REP18/CAC, at 74 (2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-
who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace. 
fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-701-41%252FReport%2 
52FFINAL%252FREP18_CACe.pdf (adopting maximum levels for lead in selected 
commodities).
84  Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 13. 
85  Id. at 18–19 (313 out of 9342 samples).
86  Id. at 9.
87  Tage Affertsholt & Daniel Pedersen, Infant Formula: A Young & Dynamic 
Market, World of Food Ingredients, 32 (2017), https://www.3abc.dk/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/06/Infant-Formula-A-Young-and-Dynamic-Market.pdf.
88  Transparency Market Research, Global Alcoholic Beverages Market to reach 
US$1,977,342.7 Million by 2025, Globe Newswire (Sept. 21, 2017, 5:53 AM), https://
globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/09/21/1125738/0/en/Global-Alcoholic-
Beverages-Market-to-reach-US-1-977-342-7-Million-by-2025-TMR.html.
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For wine there is an emerging international consensus 
supporting a forward-looking ML of .15 ppm for wine. In 2015, the 
European Union adopted an ML of .2 ppm (the current Codex ML) for 
wine vintages dating 2001 to 2015, and .15 ppm for wines produced in 
2016 or later.89 This is the same level the OIV (an intergovernmental 
wine standard organization with 46 member states) has established, 
though the OIV’s transition year is 2007 rather than 2015.90  Mercosur 
has also adopted an ML of .15 ppm, impacting Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay.91 Chile has likewise adopted an ML of .15 
ppm.92 Where countries have adopted limits, these tend to be forward 
looking limits to avoid ex post facto regulation of a class of products 
with an extremely long shelf life.93 An ML of .15 ppm would still 
provide some margin of food safety improvement (the maximum level 
of lead in a wine sample in the GEMS database was .584 ppm) without 
overly restricting international trade.94
While the only alcoholic beverage currently under consideration 
for a revised lead ML is wine,95 another EWG is currently prioritizing 
future work to establish lead MLs.96 This EWG placed significant 
priority on the consumption patterns of children for some commodities, 
but ultimately concluded alcoholic beverages (other than wine) were 
a higher priority (intermediate priority) than non-alcoholic beverages 
89  Commission Regulation 2015/1005 of June 25, 2015, Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1881/2006 as Regards Maximum Levels of Lead in Certain Foodstuffs, 2015 O.J. (L 
161), 12 [hereinafter Maximum Levels of Lead].
90  International Code of Oenological Practices, Annex Maximum Acceptable 
Limits, at 2 (Jan. 2015), http://www.oiv.int/public/medias/3741/e-code-annex-
maximum-acceptable-limits.pdf.
91  Reglamento Tecnico Mercosur Sobre Limites Maximos de Contaminantes 
Inorganicos en Alimentos 8 (2011).
92  Ministerio de Agricultura de Chile, Decreto N° 78, Art. 26 (1986).
93  See, e.g. Maximum Levels of Lead, supra note 89, at 12. Note the EU Standard has 
markedly different standards for fruit juices and for wine, presumably based on the 
divergent risk profile as a result of the disparate consumption profile.
94  Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 18.
95  See FAO & WHO, Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Rep. of the 12th 
Session of the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, REP18/




96  See Codex Discussion Paper, supra note 9, at 126–131. 
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(low priority).97 This means there will probably be an ML 
established for cognac sooner than for cola.  It is also likely the same 
methodology that is applied to Welch’s concord grape juice will apply 
to Rémy Martin Black Pearl Louis XIII. 
None of this is to say definitively that a rule based on 
tolerating a rejection rate of less than 5% is inappropriate for alcoholic 
beverages. However, there must be proportionality or else 
standards would be arbitrary. If the economic cost of applying this rule 
to alcoholic beverages is warranted based on the public health benefits, 
then CCCF must apply even stricter standards for lead MLs to 
products marketed for children and largely consumed by children.  
Tightening such standards would provide a far greater public health 
benefit for the same economic cost vis-à-vis tightening standards on 
alcoholic beverages. 
IV. Conclusion
Reducing lead exposure from food consumption is a noble 
goal. It is a goal Codex, CCCF, and the EWG all take seriously. 
However, it is an intermediate goal. The ultimate goal is to achieve 
improved public health outcomes while simultaneously minimizing 
the negative impact on international trade. All public health 
regulations are designed to create public health benefits. There are also 
economic costs to some public health regulations, including the 
adoption of international standards that are often subsumed into 
national regulations. 
It is rational that the EWG would seek to apply a 
heuristic method for balancing cost and benefit relying on the 
formulaic less than 5% rule. This approach is faster and cheaper 
than conducting an assessment that would truly comply with the 
ALARA approach. Such an assessment would require evaluating the 
economic impact of each proposed lead ML (due to restricted 
trade, or the cost to producers of modifying production 
methodologies to reduce contamination in the final product) 
weighed against a public health assessment of lead exposure with an 
age-specific regression analysis to ensure consistent application of a 
cost-benefit ratio. The former can be done with a calculator and a data 
set.    
97  Id. 
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The latter would take a team of economists and dietary experts and 
more rigorous dietary survey data, which in turn would entail a 
significant cost. However, when the very nature of the product 
makes it clear the most vulnerable would not be protected by further 
restriction, a different heuristic is called for. 
The SPS Agreement calls for “consistency in the 
application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.”98 The Codex Procedural Manual 
states “[u]njustified differences in the level of consumer health 
protection to address similar risks in different situations should be 
avoided.”99 The inherent corollary is that unjustified uniformity in the 
use of risk management metrics to address different risks posed by 
different situations should also be avoided. It would otherwise result 
in inconsistent levels of protection and arbitrary and unjustifiable 
standards.100 It is not clear that the less than 5% heuristic is 
inappropriate when applied to alcoholic beverages. However, if this is 
the rule Codex will apply to alcohol, it would do well to tighten the 
limits on products marketed for children.
98  SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 5.5.
99  Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 116. 
100  See WTO, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, at 63–72 (Oct. 12, 1998) (stating that the United States’ application 
of the same environmental standard to trading partners without considering the 
different conditions prevalent within those trading partners constituted unjustifiable 
discrimination under the chapeau of GATT Article XX).
Regulating China’s Food E-commerce: Harmonization of Laws
Pinghui Xiao*
 Introduction
Internet commercialization began in China in 1995.  Since 
then, China has seen a digitalization movement, which has become 
a joint undertaking between industry and government in the age of 
ubiquitous Internet in China. China’s Premier Li Keqiang announced 
‘Internet Plus’ as the national strategy in his Government Work Report 
presented during the Two Sessions of the year of 2015. Following 
Premier Li’s vision for the ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy, China is now 
determined “to integrate mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data, 
and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to encourage 
the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and 
Internet banking, and to help get Internet-based companies to increase 
their presence in the international market.”Under the auspices of 
‘Internet Plus’, e-commerce became one of the most important priority 
areas to promote China’s continuing prosperity.
China’s digitalization movement has substantially impacted 
the food sector, creating the so-called digital food economy and 
allowing food e-commerce, or online food trading, to become a rising 
star in China’s ever increasing digital economy. While the internet has 
connected and shaped China’s industries and businesses, it has also 
created problems. When new types of businesses proliferate and start 
to penetrate into conventional sectors, regulations, created based on 
the traditional sectors, become outdated. Unfortunately, this has been 
the case with food e-commerce as well. 
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As with any new sector, government policies and laws are not 
without drawbacks, and indeed gaps have arisen. In response, 
China has already amended its Food Safety Law in 2015 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘2015 FLS Amendment’), introducing 
specific rules related to online food trading. Equally 
importantly, in August 2018, China’s top legislature, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC, promulgated its first E-commerce 
Law, which has greatly impacted food e-commerce.
This paper documents the development of China’s digital food 
economy in the course of China’s digitalization movement and takes a 
closer look at China’s legislative approach to regulation of food 
commerce by paying particular attention to all the major pieces of 
legislation relating to food e-commerce, particularly the 2015 FLS 
Amendment and the E-commerce Law. This paper will then examine 
the challenges China faces in harmonizing its food e-commerce laws.
I. CHINA’S DIGITAL FOOD ECONOMYAND RISING FOOD E-
COMMERCE 
Food supply chain includes, but is not limited to, stages of 
production and manufacturing, storage, transport, retailing and the 
like. In other words, the whole food supply chain consists of 
agricultural production, food manufacturing, food distribution, 
catering and food import and export, which can be illustrated in the 
following figure (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Food Safety Chain
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The Internet can be widely used in the above interlinked 
sectors within the food supply chain, to create a digital food 
economy.1 The actual functionality of the Internet throughout the 
digital food economy varies. The Internet alone cannot produce 
foods, but it can be used to increase production efficiency for 
certain food production lines, like sugar plants.2 Hence, the 
application of the Internet in production and manufacturing 
exemplifies the Industrial Internet, which sees ‘the deeper meshing 
of the digital world with the world of machines holds the potential 
to bring about profound transformation to global industry’.3 
The Industrial Internet can be an efficient and productive tool to 
facilitate production and manufacturing.4 Furthermore, within 
sectors in which consumers play a larger role, such as distribution, 
catering services, and import and export, the Internet even has more 
to offer. The Internet become a transaction and trading platform for 
foods. Here in this circumstance, due to the fact that the Internet is 
used for the purpose of consumers and trading, the use of the 
Internet creates a Consumption Internet or e-commerce scenario. 
All the factors combined make China enter the age of the digital 
food economy, which is comprised of the Industrial Internet and the 
Consumption Internet, or e-commerce. 
To date, there are quite a few government initiatives 
topromote both the Industrial Internet and e-commerce in China. 
According to the Action Plan for Industrial Internet Development 
(2018-2020) enacted by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, China will have to tackle the problems arising from 
the development of the Industrial Internet.5 To do this, it will be 
necessary to carry out research on such legal issues as network 
security, data protection, as well as information protection and 
1  See Juergen Voegele, Farm and Food Policy Innovations for the Digital Age, 
Brookings Inst. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2018/10/11/farm-and-food-policy-innovations-for-the-digital-age/.
2  Peter C. Evans & Marco Annunziata, Industrial Internet: Pushing the Boundaries 
of Minds and Machines, Gen. Elec., at 16 (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.ge.com/docs/
chapters/Industrial_Internet.pdf.
3  Id. at 3
4  Id.
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government data disclosure, and enact laws and rules relating to the 
Industrial Internet when necessary.6 As per the Opinions on the 
Development of 
E-commerce to Accelerate the Development of New Economy
enacted by the State Council, China is committed to introducing laws
and rules relating to food e-commerce to speed up e-commerce.7 To
this end, China will introduce measures to regulate food e-commerce
and strengthen monitoring mechanisms for food e-commerce.8
Simply put, the above government Industrial Internet and 
e-commerce initiatives create China’s big picture of digital food
economy. Because problems arise from both the Industrial Internet
and food e-commerce in the age of the digital food economy,
regulation is required. At the moment, challenges relating to food e-
commerce are more acute and urgent than those relating to the
Industrial Internet.9 Therefore, this paper will pay more attention to
food e-commerce regulation.
According to Statista, 9 of the world’s top 20 Internet 
companies are from China.10 At least five of these Chinese Internet 
companies are involved in food e-commerce. These companies are: 
Alibaba, Baidu, JD.com, Meituan and Tencent.11 These Internet 
companies have grown to become China’s most influential food 
e-commerce platforms, which are “unicorn players involving food e-
commerce including but not limited to online food retailing, online
catering services and cross-border food e-commerce”.12
5  工业互联网发展行动计划（2018-2020 年 [Action Plan for Industrial Internet 
Development (2018-2020)], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT) (June 7, 2018), http://www.cac.gov.cn/1122955095_15284189066411n.pdf.
6  Id. at 11.
7  关于大力发展电子商务加快培育经济新动力的意见 [Opinions on the Development 
of E-commerce to Accelerate the Development of New Economy], 国务院 
[State Council] (May 4, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/
content/2015-05/07/content_9707.htm.
8  Id.
9  Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 我国网络食品立法进程及相关问题探讨 [A study of 
legislative development of online food trading and relevant issues in China], 工商行
政管理 [Administration for Industry and Commerce] (2018).
10  See Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as of May 
2018, Statista (May 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-
of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/.
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China’s food e-commerce creates market failure arising from 
information asymmetry.13 Such market failures include: unlicensed 
food businesses, fake and inferior food products purchased online, 
false information about foods, and ineffective logistics and delivery.14 
E-commerce lawsuits increased by more than 40% in 2017, far higher
than the average lawsuit growth.15 More than half of these e-commerce
lawsuits are food products related, with 83% of food e-commerce
disputes involving platforms.16 Violation of food laws has an issue for
platforms selling food. For instance, March 2016 saw many restaurants
on Ele.me, one of China’s biggest online food catering platforms,
charged for operating without licenses.17 In addition to fabricating
addresses and images of outlets shown in the platform, it was also
revealed that the platform helped food business operators fabricate
information for non-existing restaurants to create ‘ghost restaurants’,
which provided catering services.18
II. REGULATING FOOD E-COMMERCE: POLICY AND LAWS
To tackle the challenges arising from food e-commerce, China 
introduced the 2015 FSL Amendment, which became the country’s first 
law to regulate food e-commerce.19 Following the 2015 FSL 
Amendment, China Food and Drug Administration 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CFDA’) also introduced the Measures for 
Investigation and Punishment of Unlawful Acts Concerning Online
11 Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 314–16.
12  Id.
13  Id. at 315.
14  Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 互联网背景下食品安全治理研究[China’s food 
safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus]  知识产权出版社 
[Intellectual Property Publishing House, 2018] 230-31 [hereinafter 
China’s food safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus].
15  Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 313.
16  Id. 
17  Zhang Shuai, Ele.me Apologizes for Unlicensed Restaurants on App, Crenglish 
(Mar. 17, 2016, 7:12 PM), http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/03/17/3821s920837.htm.
18  Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 316.
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 Food Safety (hereinafter referred to as ‘Online Food Measures’) in 
2016 and the Measures on Supervision and Administration of Food 
Safety concerning Online Catering Services (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Online Catering Services Measures’) in 2017 to implement the law.20 
The 2015 FSL Amendment, along with the two other specific 
Measures, constitute the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster, which 
regulate food e-commerce. Of equal importance is that the Standing 
Committee of the NPC promulgated China’s first E-commerce Law 
on August 31st, 2018. This law adopted a new approach to e-
commerce regulation, which will have a profound effect on food e-
commerce.21 This E-commerce Law goes hand in hand with the 2015 
FSL Amendment cluster to shape food e-commerce. The paper will 
provide an in-depth discussion of both the 2015 E-Commerce Law 
and the 2005 FSL Amendment cluster and explore their impacts upon 
China’s rising food e-commerce regulation. 
A. Regulating food e-commerce under the 2015 FSL
Amendment cluster
Within the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster, the Online Food 
Measures and the Online Catering Services Measures are rules enacted 
by the CFDA. These rules belong to lower level of laws, which 
are meant to implement the 2015 FSL Amendment.22 However, in 
terms of coverage, both the 2015 FSL Amendment and the Online 
Food Measures are generally applied to all kinds of online food 
trading, while the Online Catering Services Measures are applied 
to online catering services providers.23 Simply put, the 2015 FSL 
19  See China Passes Sweeping Amendment to Food Safety Law: The Most Stringent To 
Date, LexisNexis (July 16,2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/public-
policy/b/public-policy-law-blog/posts/china-passes-sweeping-amendment-to-food-
safety-law-the-most-stringent-to-date.
20  Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 318–19.
21  Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 我国网络食品立法进程及相关问题探讨 [A study of 
legislative development of online food trading and relevant issues in China], 工商行政
管理 [Administration for Industry and Commerce] (2018).
22  Yibo Jiang Et Al., China Food Safety Law- Practical Procedures, Trends 
and Opportunities for Dutch Companies 5 (2018), https://www.netherlandsandyou. 
nl/binaries/netherlandsandyou/documents/publications/2018/03/14/booklet-on-the-
china-food-safety-law/final+booklet.pdf.
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Amendment and the Online Food Measures are framed to provide a 
general regulatory system for online food trading. However, the 
Online Catering Services Measures are rules established to 
specifically regulate the online catering sector rather than general 
food e-commerce.24 The 2015 FSL Amendment created a legal term 
called ‘online third-party food trading platform provider’ to denote 
the platforms involving foods.25 Considering the fact that online 
food platforms play ever-increasing role in online food trading, all the 
above pieces of legislation treat online food platforms as co-
regulators with food authorities to ensure online food safety.26 To this 
end, quite a few provisions of the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster 
compel online platforms to monitor and supervise online food 
operators. This creates a public-private co-regulation scenario, which 
reflects the so-called social co-governance principle as established in 
the 2015 FSL Amendment.27 In addition, because of the unique nature 
of the sector, special regulations have been created for online catering.
1. Obligations for online food platforms
The 2015 FSL Amendment laid down the first comprehensive 
legal obligations requiring platforms to ensure food business operators 
within the platforms do business in compliance with food safety 
requirements as laid down in the law.28 Online food platforms are 
required to fulfill the following supervisory roles: 1) to conduct real-
name registration for food business operators within the platforms and 
to define food safety management responsibility of the food business 
operators,29 2) to check and inspect licenses obtained by the food 
business operators, 3) when there is a minor noncompliance from
23  Building Food Safety Governance in China 212 (Jerome Lepeintre and Juanjuan 
Sun, eds., 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/building_food_ 
safety_governance_in_china.pdf. 
24  Id.
25  For the purpose of this paper, ‘online third-party food trading platform provider’ 
is hereinafter referred to as ‘‘online food platform provider’ and ‘online third-party 
food trading platform’ as ‘online food platform’.
26  Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 318.
27  Id.
28  Id. 
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food business operators, to stop the violation and report back to the 
local food authority, 4) when there is a serious noncompliance from 
food business operators, to stop providing services to the operators.30 
The above four tasks can be grouped into two categories of 
obligations as assumed by the platforms, namely, obligations 
relating to entry control and obligations relating to process control.
1.1 Entry control obligations 
The real-name registration and defining food safety 
management on the one hand, and license inspection on the other, are 
both concerned with entry control, which serves as a screening 
mechanism that keeps unqualified food business operators from 
entering the platforms and selling food via them.31 In addition, the 
entry control procedures also make it possible to collect relevant 
identity information from those food business operators, which allow 
the platforms to better monitor them. The above tasks evolved into 
more specific sub-tasks under the Online Food Measures. 
First, platforms are required to file official records. For those 
platforms, which are thought of solely as intermediaries, the EU is not 
poised to make them subject to licenses or any other authorizations, 
with a few case-by-case exceptions.32 However, licensing in China  has 
become a very important mechanism for government regulation, the
29  Real-name registration here should not be confused with industrial and commercial 
registration for the purpose of individual industrial and commercial households and 
companies. The former is conducted by the online platforms, which are a private 
stakeholder whereas the latter is done by public authorities. See e.g., 中华人民共和
国个体工商户条例(2016修订) [Regulation on Individual Industrial and Commercial 
Households (2016 Revision)], 国务院[State Council]  2016); 中华人民共和国
公司登记管理条例(2016修订 [Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Administration of Company Registration (2016 Revision)], 国务院
[State Council] (Feb. 6, 2016).
30  Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng xǔkě fǎ (中华人民共和国食品安全法
（2015年修订) [Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in 
2015)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, 
revised Apr. 24, 2015), art. 62 , 2015 China Law Lexis 1812 [hereinafter Food 
Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
31  FIA Staff, Food Safety in China’s e-Commerce Platforms, Food Industry Asia 
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://foodindustry.asia/food-safety-in-china-s-e-commerce-
platforms.
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legal basis of which can be found in the Administrative License 
Law.33 Under this Law, China’s public regulatory authorities grant 
licenses to citizens, legal persons, or other organization to 
engage in special activities according to their applications.34 
Since the introduction of the Administrative License Law, 
China has created a comprehensive administrative registration 
and licensing system for all kinds of commercial and industrial 
activities. The system is comprised of industrial and commercial 
registration (hereinafter referred to as ‘ICR’) as administered by 
competent public authorities and other special business licenses 
as organized by various other public authorities.35 The legal 
requirements for the former registration are laid down in the 
Regulation on the Administration of Company Registration and 
the Regulation on Individual Industrial and Commercial 
Households, whereas the latter are specified in quite a few 
scattered laws depending on specific relevant fields, for instance, the 
2015 FSL Amendment.36
Nevertheless, it was suggested that China introduce a 
licensing mechanism to online food platforms prior to the 2015 FSL 
Amendment. However, at that time, the State Council was in an 
effort to streamline administration. It announced a reform scheme 
dedicated to relaxing market access, by which the pre-existing 
32  Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region: 
A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM (2016) 356 final (Feb. 6, 
2016).
33  Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng xǔkě fǎ, (中华人民共和国行政许可法) 
[Administrative Licensing Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004),  2003 China 
Law Lexis 4454 (China). 
34  Id. at art. 1.
35  The industrial and commercial registration should not to be confused with platform 
registration, which is private by nature. See id. at art. 12.
36  See e.g.,  Guówùyuàn guānyú xiūgǎi “zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó gōngsī dēngjì 
guǎnlǐ tiáolì” de juédìng (2016) (中华人民共和国公司登记管理条例(2016修订 
[Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Company 
Registration (2016 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm, Nat’l People’s 
Cong., revised Feb. 6, 2016), 2016 China Law Lexus 1322; Food Safety Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 46.  
313 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol.14
registration and licensing would continue to be greatly 
streamlined.37  Local governments in China are undergoing 
deregulation reform, which is made possible through various 
initiatives, for instance, De-licensing Scheme created by 
Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province.38 Within the Scheme, licensing 
and other authorization mechanisms are replaced with filing for 
records, among others, to reduce market access barriers.
Online food platforms are a technology driven phenomenon 
which can help generate jobs. However, the idea to create a special 
license as a market access mechanism for these platforms was finally 
rejected.39 Instead, CFDA promulgated the Online Food Measures, and 
it introduced a recordation mechanism, which is less stringent than 
a licensing mechanism.40 The recordation mechanism is not meant 
to provide market access for platforms. Local food safety authorities 
in certain localities, where an online food platform operates, will 
at least have a record of the platform information, which helps the 
government to supervise the platforms.  
Under the Online Food Measures, the provider of an online 
food platform shall, within 30 working days upon approval by the 
competent communications authorities, file for the recordation 
37 Guó wù yuàn guān yú jiā kuài gòu jiàn qún zhòng chuàng yè chuàng xīn zhī chēng 
píng tái de zhǐ dǎo yì jiàn (国务院关于加快构建群众创业创新支撑平台的指导
意见) [Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of 
Supporting Platforms of Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation] (promulgated by the 
State Council, Sept. 23, 2015, effective Sept. 23, 2015) 2015 China Law LEXIS 1075 
(China).
38  Kuotsai Tom Liou, Local Economic Development in China and the United States: 
Strategies and Issues, 69 Pub. Admin. Rev. S29 (2009).
39  See WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ 
(网络食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures of Investigation of Illegal Conducts 
Concerning the Safety of Food Sold Online] (promulgated by China Food and Drug 
Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016) art. 16, 2016 Lexis China 
Law 370, (China). (stating that “a party engaging in food production that has obtained 
licensing for food production is not required to obtain licensing for food business 
operations if it sells self-produced food products online” and “a party engaging in 
food business operations that has obtained licensing for food business operations is 
not required to obtain licensing for food production if it sells online food products that 
it produces and processes”).
40  See id., at art. 5 (stating that “providers of third-party online food transaction 
platforms and parties engaging in food production and business operations by 
online means shall . . . provide relevant data an information concerning online food 
transactions in accordance with the requirements of food and drug administrations” 
and making no mention of a licensing requirement under the measure).
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formalities with the provincial food authority at the place where it 
is located.41 Upon success, the provider will be issued a recordation 
number. The information for recordation shall include domain name, 
IP address, telecommunications business permit, enterprise name, 
name of the enterprise’s legal representative or person in charge 
and recordation number, among others. The food authorities at the 
provincial level and the municipal and county level shall, within 7 
working days after the completion of the filing, disclose the relevant 
recordation information to the public.42
Second, platforms are entitled to make rules. The provider of 
an online food platform is obliged to introduce all kinds of rules to 
ensure industry compliance from food business operators, which is 
comparable to rule-making. Here the rule-making obligation actually 
amounts to rule-making powers delegated from the government, 
which empowers online food platforms to be legislators. Online food 
platforms are now officially recognized as rule makers. This enables 
online food platforms to be more institutionalized to supervise online 
food operators within the platforms. 
These rules were enacted to examine and register online food 
business operators, to stop and report violations of food safety laws, to 
stop platform from providing services for severe violators of laws, and 
to publicly disclose the relevant rules on the online platform.43 
Third, platforms are required to inspect business licenses and 
other information of the food business operators. Under the 
Administrative License Law, ICRs, and specific business licenses 
constitute the fundamental business licensing institutions in China.44 
As for food business operation, those operating food businesses 
will have to apply for food business licenses from CFDA. Food 
business operators include food producers, food retailers and catering 
services providers, among others in China. Chinese food businesses 
are generally divided into two types, namely, food production and 
distribution. Correspondingly, China creates two food business 
41  Id. at art. 8.
42  Id.
43  Id. at art. 10.
44   See Zhōnghuá, supra note 46.
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licenses for the entire food chain, namely, food production licenses 
and food distribution licenses.45
The above-mentioned food business licenses are granted by 
public authorities rather than online food platforms.46 However, the 
provider of an online food platform is obliged to inspect relevant food 
licenses of production, food additive production, and/or food 
distribution as obtained by online food business operators, and record 
and update when needed. In the case of small food business operators, 
in particular small farm operators selling edible agricultural products 
over the platform, the provider is obliged to keep a record of the 
operators’ ICR, ID number, home address, contact information, and 
update when needed.47
Fourth, platforms are required to conduct profiling and filing 
of food business operators. China’s food authorities engage 
in profiling and filing activities for the purposes of food business 
operators. For instance, local food authorities at and above the county 
level should create food safety credit files of food producers and 
distributors to record the information on the issuance of food 
production licenses, inspection of licensing matters, daily supervision 
and inspection, and investigation of and punishment against licensing-
45  See, e.g., Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (2017 xiū zhèng) (食品生产许可
管理办法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11, 
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017) 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410 (China); Shí pǐn jīng 
yíng xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理办法) [Administrative Measures for 
Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug 
Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015) Enpkulaw.cn CLI.4.256408 
(EN) (China).
46  See Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě  guǎn lǐ bàn f ǎ (2017 xiū  zhèng) (食品生产许可管
理办法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11, 
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017) 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410 (China) (noting that 
“local food and drug administrative authorities at or above the county level shall be 
responsible for the food production licensing administration within their respective 
administrative areas”); see Shí pǐn jīng yíng xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the 
China Food and Drug Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015) 
Enpkulaw. cn CLI.4.256408 (EN) (China) (noting that “local food and drug 
administration at and above the county level shall be responsible for administering 
food distribution licensing within their respective administrative regions”).
47  Wǎng luò shí pǐn ān quán wéi fǎ xíng wéi chá chǔ bàn fǎ (网络食品安全违法行为
查处办法) [Measures for the Investigation and Handling of Illegalities of Online Food 
Safety] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, July 13, 2016, 
effective Oct. 1, 2016), art. 11, Westlaw China Order No. 27.
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related violations, among others.48 The filing can be used to increase 
the frequency of supervision and inspection of food producers 
and distributors in case of poor credit records.49 This will be made 
public, through which food business operators can be motivated to 
abide by the law. Food authorities are also required to create files of 
food business operators for their own records.50 For instance, a food 
authority at or above the county level, shall establish management 
rules for food production and distribution licensing archives, and 
archive in a timely manner the materials on the above licenses.51
Similarly, as the provider of an online food platform is 
considered a co-regulator, it is obliged to create a profile of online 
food business operators and file accordingly. In addition, it will have 
to keep a record of the basic information of the food business 
operators and the food safety management personnel.52
Profiling and filing here is different from filing for an official 
record as discussed above. Here the information for profiling and 
filing is mainly from the food business operators whereas filing for 
an official record is targeted at information of online food platforms. 
1.2 Process control obligations
The process control requirements as laid down in the 2015 
FSL Amendment, oblige platforms to monitor and supervise food 
business operators within the platforms.53 The above tasks evolve into 
more specific sub-tasks under the Online Food Measures.
48  Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (2017 xiū zhèng) (食品生产许可管理办
法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11, 
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017), art. 45, 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410. 
49  Id. at art. 40, art. 45.
50  Id.
51  Id. at art. 48; Shí pǐn jīng yíng xǔ  kě  guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理办法) 
[Administrative Measures for Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the 
China Food and Drug Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015), art. 43, 
Enpkulaw.cn CLI.4.256408 (EN) (China). 
52  Wangluo Shipinanquan Weifa Xingwei Chachu Banfa (网络食品安全违法行为
查处办法) [Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Safety of Food 
Offered through Online Catering Services] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug 
Admin., Nov. 06, 2017, effective Jan. 01, 2018), art. 13, 2017 China Law Lexis 1348.
53  Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 78. 
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First, platforms are obliged to fulfill certain technical 
requirements. In 2016, China promulgated the Cyber Security 
Law, the first of its kind in China.54 The law recognizes the Internet 
provides a very important infrastructure for economic development 
and, if not well controlled, could endanger national security.55 Under 
the law, even food delivery platforms may be considered critical 
infrastructure.56 This means that any entity considered “critical 
information infrastructure”, some of which hold significant amounts 
of information on Chinese citizens, will be under scrutiny from 
cyberspace regulators.57
Similarly, an online food platform is required to fulfill 
technical requirements before they provide services. Technical 
requirements include, but are not limited to, maintaining data backup 
and recovery technologies with a view of ensuring the reliability and 
security of the data and information relating to online food trading.58
Second, platforms will have to maintain a record-keeping 
system to document business transactions of the food business 
operators. Under 2015 FSL Amendment, record-keeping is a very 
important mechanism to ensure compliance.59 Both food producers 
and distributors are required to keep a record of product and trading 
information. For instance, a food distributor shall establish a record 
system for checking the purchased food, honestly record the name, 
specifications, quantity, date or batch number of production, 
shelf life, and date of purchase of food and the names, addresses, and
54 Zhonghua Renmin Gongeguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全
法) [Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), 
2016 China Law LEXIS 1398.
55  Id. at art. 1. 
56  Mirren Gidda, China’s New Cybersecurity Law Could Cost Foreign Companies 
Their Ideas, Newsweek (May 31, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/china-
cybersecurity-hacking-intellectual-property-multinationals-618345.
57  Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber Security Law: The Impossibility 
of Compliance?, Forbes (May 29, 2017),https://www.forbes.com/sites/
riskmap/2017/05/29/chinas-cyber-security-law-theimpossibility-of-compliance/
#1d96f231471c.
58  WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ 
(网络食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures for Investigation and  Punishment of 
Unlawful Acts concerning Online Food Safety] (promulgated by China Food and 
Drug Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016), art. 9, 2016 Lexis 
China Law 370 [hereinafter Measures for Investigation].
59  Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 46. 
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contact methods of suppliers, and retain the relevant vouchers.60 The 
retention period of records and vouchers shall not be less than six 
months after the expiry of the shelf-life of products; or shall not be 
less than two years for products without an express shelf life.61
Similarly, the provider of an online food platform is obliged to 
maintain a record of food trading information and record-keeping time 
shall not be less than 6 months after the expiry date of the food 
products; in case of food products without any express expiry date, 
record-keeping time shall not be less than 2 years after the selling.62
Third, platforms are required to monitor business operation of 
the food business operators within the platforms. The provider of an 
online food platform trading platform is obliged to set up a food safety 
department or assign a food safety professional to inspect online food 
business activities and information.63 If the provider is aware of food 
safety violations, it shall timely stop and report them to the local food 
authorities at the county level.64
The above obligation requires platforms to detect misconducts 
and false information from food business operators. As observed 
by Mr. Chen Xu, former Director-General of CFDA’s Department 
of Legal Affairs, online catering platforms are required to conduct 
random inspection and surveillance to detect noncompliance from the 
catering service providers.65 This is very challenging to some extent, 
because platforms are expected to monitor the whole process of online 
food business running within the platforms. In practice, the platforms 
only have information of food products and logistics, submitted or 
generated by food business operators. The platforms are expected to 
60  Id. at art. 51.
61  WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ (网络
食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures of Investigation of Illegal Conducts 
Concerning the Safety of Food Sold Online] (promulgated by China Food and Drug 
Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016) art. 13, 2016 Lexis China 
Law 370, 5 (China).
62  Id. at art. 14.
63  Id.
64  Id.
65  See id. at arts. 29–37 (providing penalties for platform providers who fail to comply 
with various obligations pertaining to the monitoring and record-keeping of online 
food producer/trader business practices).
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watch business activities from online food businesses. This is hardly 
made possible for platforms without assigning their management team 
for an on-site inspection. However, it is too expensive for online food 
platforms, in particular those involving food retailing, to create teams 
like this. Simply put, the platforms involving food retailing don’t 
think it is feasible for them to do on-site inspection, considering high 
cost arising from manpower and time. Nevertheless, there is 
no clarification as to how this obligation should be implemented in 
practice to date. 
Fourth, platforms are required to stop providing services 
under certain specific circumstances. One the one hand, Online Food 
Measures specifies scenarios in which the platforms will have to stop 
providing services to online food operators upon their serious 
violations. On the other hand, there are scenarios in which authorities 
will order platform providers to cease operations their failure to fulfill 
obligations leads to public harm.
The provider of an online food platform trading platform is 
obligated to timely stop and report food safety violations to the food 
authorities when a violation is made known to it.66 In case of serious 
violation, the provider must stop providing further platform services to 
the violator. Scenarios of serious violations include, among others, the 
following circumstances: 1) online food business operators accused of 
a crime relating to food safety are being investigated by public 
security departments or prosecuted by procuratorate;67 2) online food 
business operators are convicted of a crime relating to food safety by 
court;68 3) online food business operators are held in detention 
or punished with other administrative penalties by public security 
66 See id. at art. 15 (requiring online third-party food trading platforms to cease 
provision of services to online food traders and producers who are under investigation 
for or are civilly or criminally liable for violations); see also id. at art. 37 (requiring 
Food and Drug Administration officials to order third- party platform providers to 
cease operations when providers’ failures cause serious foodborne illness, death, the 
infringement of consumers’ rights and interests, or other serious consequences). See 
also, 肖平辉[Pinghui Xiao], 互联网背景下食品安全治理研究[China’s Food 
Safety Governance in the Age of the Internet Plus]   (知识产权出版
社[Intellectural Property Publishing House] 54 (2018). 
67  Id. at art. 15.
68  Id. 
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departments due to violation of food safety laws;69 and 4) online food 
business operators are ordered to cease business operation or their 
food licenses are revoked by food authorities.70
The provider of an online food platform trading platform shall 
be ordered to cease operation and the case will be filed to 
communications departments for investigation when failing to fulfill 
relevant obligations cause the following serious consequences: 1)death 
or serious injury, 2) serious food safety incidents, 3) serious foodborne 
illness, 4) violating consumers’ legal rights and interests and causing 
serious adverse social impacts.71
2. Special rules for online small food operators
According to the International Labour Organization, small 
food business operators like street vendors absorb large numbers of 
surplus labour. But there is a demand side as well. A mass of 
consumers welcome street vendors because they provide consumers 
with the accessibility to affordable goods and services. Therefore, it 
can have positive impacts on poverty reduction, employment, 
entrepreneurship, and social mobility to ensure the right to run small 
businesses.72 Over the past thirty years, China’s urban population has 
risen from 22.9% to 56.8% of its 1.3 billion people.73 China’s 
urbanization has seen a large migrant population enter large and 
medium-sized cities. “Currently, many people from the countryside 
live in cities, but lack access to social services[,]” which means, for 
instance, they have few jobs. That actually creates a barrier to social 
stability.74 So job creation is of great importance to maintain the social
69  Id. 
70  Id.
71  Id. at art. 37.
72  Kʏᴏᴋᴏ  Kᴜꜱᴀᴋᴀᴋᴇ, Iɴᴛ’ʟ Lᴀʙᴏᴜʀ Oʀɢ., Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Iꜱꜱᴜᴇꜱ ᴏɴ Sᴛʀᴇᴇᴛ Vᴇɴᴅɪɴɢ: Aɴ 
Oᴠᴇʀᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏꜰ Sᴛᴜᴅɪᴇꜱ ɪɴ Tʜᴀɪʟᴀɴᴅ, Cᴀᴍʙᴏᴅɪᴀ ᴀɴᴅ Mᴏɴɢᴏʟɪᴀ 3 (2006).
73  Brendan Ahern & Grant DePoyster, A Journey to the New Heart of Urbanization in 
China, KʀᴀɴᴇSʜᴀʀᴇꜱ (Aug. 15, 2017), h ttps://kraneshares.com/a-journey-to-the-
new-heart-of-urbanization-in-china/.
74  Sara Hsu, China’s Urbanization Plans Need To Move Faster In 2017, Fᴏʀʙᴇꜱ (Dec. 
28, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/12/28/chinas-urbanization-
plans-need-to-move-faster-in-2017/#6a58422174db.
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stability. China is now entering the age of the ubiquitous Internet. 
The Chinese government has considered it a great means to 
generate prosperity and jobs. In addition, it also treats online 
platforms as a channel to nurture small businesses under the so-
called Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Campaign.75
Thus, small food businesses play an important role in 
China. According to Jiangsu Province, among its 330,000 catering 
service providers more than 70 percent are small businesses.76 As 
China experienced rapid economic growth since its open policy, “it 
also faced an accompanying [] widening income gap[,]” and there 
is a lack of balanced regional development, due to stark differences 
between coastal areas and rural regions.77 Considering all the above 
factors, local governments are required to promulgate local rules to 
administer small food workshops, food vendors, and other small 
food business operators under the 2015 FSL Amendment.78 That 
means China introduces a regulatory decentralization strategy to 
regulation of small food business operation in considering local 
circumstances. Simply put, rules and policies as applied to small 
food workshops and food vendors, among other small food business 
operators, vary from province to province. 
Indeed, due to the decentralization approach to small food 
business regulation, different provinces have introduced different 
policies to regulate online small food businesses. Some advocate 
full liberalization, while others totally prohibit small food operators 
from doing business over the Internet. For instance, Hebei Province 
75  关于大力推进大众创业万众创新若干政策措施的意见 [Opinions on Policy 
Measures Implemented to Promote Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation], 国
务院 [State Council of the People’s Rep. of China] (2015); see China boosts 
mass entrepreneurship and innovation, Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Pᴇᴏᴘʟᴇ’ꜱ R ᴇ ᴘ .  ᴏ ꜰ 
Cʜɪɴᴀ (Jun. 16, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/06/16/
content_281475128473681.htm (noting the government’s specific intents to promote 
means to support Internet service providers, start-ups, and “platforms for innovative 
technologies[.]”).  
76丁冬[Dong Ding], 小餐饮立法与监管政策评析（上）[Analysis on legislation 
and policy of small catering services industry (part one)], 中国医药报 
[China Pharmaceutical News], (Aug. 22, 2018).
77  Sara Hsu, High Income Inequality Still Festering In China, Fᴏʀʙᴇꜱ (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/11/18/high-income-inequality-still-
festering-in-china/#571e0e291e50.
78  Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 36.
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promulgated local rules allowing small food business operators 
including small workshops, vendors and small restaurants to sell 
foods and provide catering services via the Internet.79 Those small 
food operators can enter online platforms to do business after real-
name registration.80 Guangdong Province, however, does not allow 
small workshops to sell the foods produced thereby over the 
Internet.81 That piecemeal approach creates a challenge for online 
small food business operators and online food platforms. For 
instance, foods produced in small workshops in Hebei can be 
legally sold in this province over the Internet. However, if they are 
sold to consumers in Guangdong over the Internet, they can be 
considered illegal according to rules as established in Guangdong.82 
Taken together, small food businesses, including small workshops 
and small restaurants, which trade foods over the Internet are 
encouraged to respect but are not required to abide by the Online 
Food Measures enacted by CFDA, which is regarded as a national 
rule applied throughout the entire country.83 
B. Regulating food e-commerce under the E-commerce
Law cluster
The E-commerce Law created the term ‘e-commerce 
business operators’, which denotes natural persons, legal persons, 
or organizations without the status of legal person that engage 
in the business activities of selling commodities, or providing 
services, through the Internet or any other information network. 
Here e-commerce business operators comprise: 1) e-commerce 
platform business operators, 2) in-platform business operators, and 
3) e-commerce business operators that sell commodities or provide
79 河北省食品小作坊小餐饮小摊点管理条例[Regulation of Small Food 
Workshops, Small Canteens and Food Vendors in Hebei]  (Hebei People’s 
Congress Standing Committee), art. 17 (2016). 
80  Id. 
81  China’s food safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus, supra note 
27, at 299.
82  Id. at 303.
83  Measures for Investigation, supra note 71, at art. 46.
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services through a self-built website or any other network services.84 
Of note is that ‘business operators’ are used in a very broad sense here, 
so platform providers are considered e-commerce business operators. 
In comparison, the 2015 FSL Amendment, through its provisions 
relating to online food trading, make it clear that food business 
operators are intentionally distinguished from platform providers. 
It further implies that providing platform services is not regarded as a 
business operation.85 In other words, the 2015 FSL Amendment treats 
food business operators in a narrow sense, and online food platforms 
are not considered food business operators. Taken together, the term 
‘platform providers’ in the 2015 FSL Amendment and that of 
‘platform business operators’ in the E-commerce Law both recognize 
platforms are run as third-party entities to provide services, though the 
interpretation of ‘business operation’ is treated in a different manner in 
these two laws. Nevertheless, the E-commerce Law recognizes the 
special characteristics of platforms. So an ‘e-commerce platform 
business operator’ is especially defined as a legal person, or an 
organization without the status of legal person. The platform provides 
multiple parties with services, such as online places of business, 
match-making, and releasing information, for them to independently 
conduct trading activities.86 Simply put, e-commerce platform business 
operators are articulated to be different from other e-commerce 
business operators, e.g., those directly selling goods and providing 
services to consumers. The above observation is equivalent to saying 
that, as far as e-commerce as defined in the E-commerce Law and 
online food trading as described in the 2015 FSL Amendment are 
concerned, ‘e-commerce platform business operators’ are similar, if 
not identical to ‘online platform providers.’ 
Similarly, the law recognizes the co-governance principle 
as previously established in the 2015 FSL Amendment. China is 
84  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianzishangwu Fa 中华人民共和国电子商务法 [E-
commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), 2018 Cʜɪɴᴀ Lᴀᴡ 
LEXIS 633,  art. 9 [hereinafter E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
85  See Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 62 
(describing the requirements of third-party platforms).
86  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 9.
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dedicated to establishing a collaborative regulatory system in line with 
the characteristics of e-commerce and promoting the formation of an 
e-commerce market governance system jointly participated in by
relevant authorities, e-commerce industry associations, e-commerce
businesses, and consumers, among others, so e-commerce platforms
are treated as a co-regulators of e-commerce under the E-commerce
Law.87 The law creates a collaborative governance scenario, in which
e-commerce platform business operators play a key role in regulation
of e-commerce. In addition, the E-commerce Law also created
the term ‘in-platform business operator’ to denote an e-commerce
business which sells commodities or provides services through an
e-commerce platform, which is different from an e-commerce operator
through self-built websites.88 Like in the 2015 FSL Amendment
cluster, special rules were created for the purpose of small e- 
commerce businesses under the E-commerce Law.89
1. Obligations for e-commerce platform business operators
Under the E-commerce Law, similar to the 2015 FSL 
Amendment, the e-commerce platform business operators are obliged 
to ensure that in-platform business operators are in conformity with 
law. To this end, provisions for purposes of both entry control and 
process control mechanisms are created.
1.1 Entry control obligations
 Under the law, the in-platform business operator is obliged to 
submit information including its identity, address, contact information, 
and administrative licensing to the platform business operator. In 
addition, the platform business operator shall establish a register, and 
make regular updates and inspection of the above information.90 For 
87  Id. at art 7.
88  Id. at art. 9.
89  Id. at art. 71.
90  Id. at art. 27.
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those individuals who are eligible to conduct e-commerce activities 
and can be exempted from ICRs, e.g., a farmer selling agricultural or 
sideline products produced by him or herself, the platform will have to 
at least verify and keep a record of basic information of those 
individuals, whereas in the case of in-platform business operators 
operating as legal persons or organizations without the status of legal 
person, on top of that information, the platform will also have to verify 
and keep a record of business licenses.91 Of note is that a co-regulation 
scenario is applied here, in which both e-commerce regulatory 
authorities and platform business operators play a role. Simply put, the 
e-commerce regulatory authorities issue all kinds of business licenses
and the platform business operators will have to inspect the above
licenses as required by the law so they are complementary to each
other in this context.92
When an e-commerce platform business operator provides 
services for non-business users selling commodities or provides 
services in the platform, the e-commerce platform business operator 
shall observe the relevant provisions in this Section.93 Here, ‘non-
business users’ largely denotes those second-hand goods or occasional 
sellers who are not regular business operators and thus exempted from 
business licenses. For safety and security purposes, platform business 
operators will have to collect their information before they are allowed 
to conduct e-commerce activities within the platforms.94
The e-commerce platform business operator shall submit 
the identity information of in-platform business operators to the 
administrative authorities of market regulation as required and remind 
any in-platform business operator that has not obtained ICRs to file for 
application from relevant public authorities as required by the law. In 
this case, it will cooperate with the administrative authorities of market 
regulation and offer help to in-platform business operator to file for 
91  Id. 
92 赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], 中华人民共和国电子商务法释义与原 [Interpretation 
and Principles of the E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (中国法制出版社[China Legal Publishing House]. 2018).156-7.
93  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 27.
94  赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 157.
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ICRs.95 E-commerce platform business operators are required to 
share information collected from those in-platform business 
operators with public authorities to better regulate e-commerce.96 In 
addition, an e-commerce platform business operator shall submit the 
identity information and the information related to tax payment of in-
platform business operators to the taxation authorities.97 In the third 
reading of the draft E-commerce Law, platform business operators 
were even required to submit information of e-commerce business 
activities to the taxation authorities on top of identity information. But 
the information of e-commerce business activities can be interpreted 
so loosely that even trade secrets and like information can be included, 
which is not implementable in practice. So the idea of including 
information of e-commerce business activities was ultimately 
discarded.98 
1.2 Process control obligations
The E-commerce Law enforces all kinds of process control 
measures, which require e-commerce platform business operators to 
serve as a qualified supervisor of in-platform business operators in a 
relatively all-encompassing struggle against e-commerce industry in 
compliance. To this end, platform business operators are required to 
take a few process control measures relating to monitoring, technical 
requirements, business transaction recordation, platform rule-making 
and anti-manipulation, among other things.99   
First, platform business operators are required to take 
measures to monitor certain e-commerce activities as conducted by in-
platform business operators and take relevant measures when needed. 
All e-commerce business operators are required by the Law to obtain 
relevant administrative licensing.100 In addition, an e-commerce 
95  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 28. 
96  赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 162.
97  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 28. 
98  赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 162.
99  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97.
100  Id. at art. 12.
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business operator should not sell commodities or provide services 
which do not meet the requirements for guaranteeing personal and 
property safety and for environmental protection and shall not 
sell or provide commodities or services the trading of which is 
prohibited by any law or administrative regulation.101 Where an e-
commerce platform business operator discovers that any information 
on commodities or services in its platform fails under any above 
circumstances, it shall take necessary disposition measures in 
accordance with the law and report to the relevant competent 
authorities.102 Necessary disposition measures include, but are not 
limited to, stopping the violation in a timely manner and ceasing 
providing online trading platform services. The former is applied 
in cases of any minor violation and the latter for any serious illegal 
act. More importantly, the platform has an obligation to report the 
violation to the authorities and provide relevant information when 
necessary. Here the information to be provided is so comprehensive 
that it can include identity, e-commerce business activities, and 
the like.103 It is of importance to note that an e-commerce platform 
business operator serving as a private regulator can take measures, 
such as warning and suspension or termination of services, against an 
in-platform business in violation of any law or regulation. The 
platform business operators act this way according to the prior 
platform service agreement and transaction rules as established 
between the platform and in-platform business operators, and timely 
publication shall be made in that scenario.104
Second, there are certain technical requirements, which 
platform business operators must meet. An e-commerce platform 
business shall take technological measures and other necessary 
measures to ensure its cyber security and stable operation, prevent 
online illegal and criminal activities, effectively tackle cyber security 
events, and guarantee e-commerce trading security.105 Cyber security 
101  Id. at art. 13. 
102  Id. at art. 29. 
103  赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 166.
104  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 36. 
105  Id. at art. 30
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became a top priority in China, and China’s first Cyber Security Law 
was promulgated to tackle ever-increasing hacker attacks and 
cybercrime in 2016.106 According to the law, the Internet is regarded as 
an infrastructure of great importance for economic development. It 
further contends that cyberspace, if the country loses control of it, can 
endanger national security.107 The law creates the term ‘critical 
information infrastructure’, which is so broad that it encompasses both 
traditional critical sectors like power and transport as well as other 
infrastructure which could likely harm the people’s livelihoods. As the 
Financial Times reported, even online catering platforms could be 
considered critical infrastructure.108 The Law requires that any entity 
considered a critical information infrastructure, together with those 
companies having significant amounts of information on Chinese 
citizens, should take responsibility to ensure cyber security.109 Simply 
put, e-commerce platforms, including online catering platforms, can 
be regarded as critical infrastructure, so platform business providers 
are required to take technical measures to ensure the safe and stable 
operation of the platforms and prevent illegal criminal activities 
therein.110 
Third, platform business operators are required to keep 
a record of information of business transactions. An e-commerce 
platform business operator shall record and retain information on the 
commodities and services and transaction information released in the 
platform and ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of 
the information. The information on commodities, services, and 
106  Zhonghua Renmin Gongeguo Wangluo Anquan Fa中华人民共和国网络安全法 
[Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), 2016 
Cʜɪɴᴀ Lᴀᴡ Lᴇxɪꜱ 1398.
107  Id. at art. 1.
108  Mirren Gidda, China’s New Cybersecurity Law Could Cost Foreign Companies 
Their Ideas, Newsweek (May 31, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
china-cybersecurity-hacking-intellectual-property-multinationals-618345.
109  Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber Security Law: The Impossibility 
of Compliance?, FORBES (May 29, 2017, 3:29 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2017/05/29/chinas-cyber-security-law-the-
impossibility-of-compliance/#157cb17b471c.
110  Brian Marterer, China’s New E-commerce Food Safety Measures, PWC, https://
www.pwccn.com/en/food-supply/publications/china-new-e-commerce-food-safety-
measures/cfda-measures-for-e-commerce-food-safety.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 
2018).
329 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol.14
transactions shall be retained for at least three years from the day of 
completion of the transaction, unless otherwise provided by any law 
or administrative regulation.111 Of note is that the information kept 
here is different from the information required during the entry 
control in the sense that the former is about business transactions 
whereas the latter concerns identity. The information of business 
transactions can be divided into two types, namely information of 
commodities as sold and services as provided within the platform, 
first, and trading information, second.112
Fourth, agreements and platform rules, which platform 
business operators are entitled to introduce will have to meet certain 
criteria. Online platforms, including e-commerce platforms, are 
engines for growth and innovation. To create a good environment for 
platforms to scale up, they are recognized as a private legislator to lay 
down certain platform rules, which in-platform business operators will 
have to comply with. Nevertheless, generally speaking, agreements 
and platform rules from the platforms are considered contractual 
terms, which have to be negotiated and agreed by both parties to a 
certain contract. Because platforms can be incredibly powerful, they 
may have the ability to manipulate their power to lay down unfair 
terms. To avoid manipulation by the platforms, China created a 
lifecycle interference mechanism to prevent potential manipulation. In 
general, there are quite a few principles for platform rule-making.113 
An e-commerce platform business operator shall abide by the 
principles of openness, equity, and impartiality; develop a platform 
service agreement and transaction rules; and specify the rights and 
obligations in aspects such as joining and leaving the platform, 
assurance of the quality of commodities and services, protection 
of consumer rights and interests, and protection of individual 
information.114
In addition, there are quite a few procedural requirements to 
be fulfilled by platforms when making platform rules. For instance, an 
111  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 
31. 
112  Id. at art. 2.
113  Id. at art. 32.
114  Id. 
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e-commerce platform business operator shall continuously publish the 
information regarding its platform service agreement and transaction 
rules, or the mark of the link to the aforesaid information, at a 
conspicuous place of its homepage to ensure the easy and complete 
reading and download by businesses and consumers.115 Another good 
example can be explained in the following circumstances. An e-
commerce platform business operator is obliged, when amending its 
platform service agreement or transaction rules, to ask for public 
opinion at a conspicuous place of its homepage and take reasonable 
measures to ensure that each side is able to express opinions in a 
timely manner. The amendment shall be published at least seven days 
prior to its entry into force.116
Fifth, there is an anti-manipulation mechanism created to 
prevent abuse of market power from platforms. Market power occurs 
if a company has a significant share of the market, and many online 
platforms including e-commerce ones in China are unicorns in certain 
fields, which then enables them to use their technology and other 
powerful means to abuse market power, which in a way constitutes a 
violation of anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition laws.117 An e- 
commerce platform business operator shall not, by means such as 
service terms, transaction rules, and technology, unreasonably restrict, 
or additionally set unreasonable conditions against the transactions and 
trading prices of an in-platform business operator in the platform, or its 
transactions with other businesses, or collect unreasonable fees from an 
in-platform business operator.118    
2. Special rules for small e-commerce businesses
An e-commerce business shall apply for an ICR, but the 
following are exempt from this obligation: 1)those individuals, selling
115  Id. at art. 33.
116  Id. at art. 34.
117  Chen Xinlei, China’s Digital Monopolies are Killing Competition and Need to be 
Regulated, Sᴏᴜᴛʜ Cʜɪɴᴀ Mᴏʀɴɪɴɢ Pᴏꜱᴛ (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/article/1850448/chinas-digital-monopolies-are-killing-
competition-and-need.
118  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 35.
331 Journal of Food Law & Policy [Vol.14
agricultural or sideline products produced by them; 2) those selling 
products of a cottage industry; 3) those use their own skills to engage 
in public convenience services; 4) occasional and low-value 
transactions, for which no license is required by the law; or 5) those 
specified unless an ICR is not required by laws or administrative 
regulations.119
In 2018, China announced the Strategic Plan for Rural 
Revitalization (2018-2022).120 Rural areas are encouraged to take full 
advantage of e-commerce and ‘Internet Plus’ to strengthen agricultural 
product brand marketing. Internet companies are encouraged 
to establish agricultural service platforms to help better market 
agricultural products. China is dedicated to promoting e-commerce in 
rural areas and building extensive infrastructure for the development 
of e-commerce there.121 All the factors combined indicate that farmers 
in rural areas can have greater opportunities to sell agricultural 
products produced by themselves, including fresh produce, fruits and 
vegetables, and Chinese medical herbs via the Internet.122 At present, 
the e-commerce market is saturated in cities, whereas there is much 
room in rural areas. 
Social media platforms like Webo and WeChat in China are 
ubiquitous and widely used in China, which due to their large user 
body, generate a hybrid type of e-commerce, namely social media 
e-commerce. Most social media users are individuals, so e-commerce 
business operators in social media platforms are individuals, and they 
are labeled as a ‘Micro Business’ in China, which connotes small 
businesses conducted in an informal way.123
119  Id. at art. 10.
120  Guo Yiming, Rural Revitalization Highlighted at Two Sessions, Cʜɪɴᴀ.Oʀɢ.CN 
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2018/2018-03/05/
content_50659387.htm.
121  Id.
122  See Teresa Schroeder, Chinese Regulation of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the 
Modern World: Can the Chinese Effectively Profit From One of Their Most Valuable 
Cultural Resources?, 11 Pᴀᴄ.. Rɪᴍ. L. & Pᴏʟ. J. 687, 709 (2002) (discussing China’s 
regulations for online marketing of medicinal herbs which qualify as Traditional 
Chinese Medicine, as opposed to medicinal herbs farmers can market as edible 
agricultural products).
123  Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in 
China, 13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ. 313, 321–22 (2018) [hereinafter Legislative 
Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China].
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III. REGULATING CHINA’S FOOD
E-COMMERCE: HARMONIZATION OF LAWS
As observed by Fortin, an administrative agency in the U.S. 
can serve as the legislator, the prosecutor and the judge, ‘all rolled 
into one’, which creates open debate on the legality of these powerful 
agencies. To prevent abuse of power, the U.S., however, limits these 
agencies to stringent procedural requirements coupled with court 
review mechanisms.124 For a long time, online platforms in China also 
acted like a three-in-one entity with powers of private rule-making, 
execution, and dispute settlement, and therefore, similarly, questions 
arise as to whether or not this is acceptable and how the platforms can 
be better controlled.125 Interestingly, the Chinese government did not 
intervene in this Internet economy ecosystem, but actually created 
a relatively loose and supportive market policy environment during 
the early stages of Internet development. The Chinese government 
understands that the concentration of these powers in online platforms 
in that way could make Chinese platform economy scale up to be 
competitive in the world. This idea can be seen in policy documents of 
China’s ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy in the course of China’s digitalization 
movement.126 However, there is an issue of harmonization between the 
2015 FSL Amendment and the E-commerce Law. 
124  N. D. Fortin, Food Regulation: Law, Science, Policy, and Practice 10 (Wiley 
ed., 2nd ed. 2017).
125  Legislative Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China, supra note 
135, at 320.
126  For instance, the State Council announced a policy document stating that the 
Chinese government is dedicated to ‘cultivating’ Internet platforms with global 
influence. To this end, the enterprises will be hoped to play a key role in establishing 
of an &quot;Internet +&quot; industrial innovation network or industrial technology 
innovation alliance, which is a joint undertaking by enterprises, industries, universities 
and research institutes. The leading enterprises are the main driver to create innovative 
platforms. To achieve these goals, the Chinese government is committed to breaking 
down industry barriers to lay a great foundation for the Internet industry to scale up. 
See 国务院关于积极推进“互联网＋”行动的指导意见 [Guiding Opinions of the State 
Council on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Strategy] (2015), http://www.gov. 
cn/zhengce/content/2015-07/04/content_10002.htm.
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A. Harmonization of definitions and liabilities
For a long time, in practice, food e-commerce and online food 
trading have been considered two interchangeable notions in China.127 
However, when the E-commerce Law was enacted in August 2018, 
the legal interpretation of these two terms faced challenges. 
Under the E-commerce Law, e-commerce is defined to 
contain ‘any business activities of selling commodities or providing 
services via the Internet or any other information network.’128 
However, under the 2015 FSL Amendment, the term ‘online trading,’ 
rather than ‘e-commerce,’ is used, and ‘online trading’ is left 
undefined.129 Horizontally, both the E-commerce Law and the 2015 
FSL Amendment belong to the same level of laws enacted by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. Simply put, according to the 
Legislation Law, neither law is subordinate to the other.130 In theory 
then, the E-commerce Law, in defining the term of ‘e-commerce’ 
seems to produce more legal predictability and certainty than the 2015 
FSL Amendment, which does not provide a definition of ‘online 
trading’. Professor Gao Fuping argued that since China enacted 
Electronic Signature Law in 2004, for the purpose of not confusing the 
E-commerce Law with this Law, China should introduce an Internet
Commerce Law or an Online Commerce Law rather than the E-
commerce Law.131 Of note is that according to some scholars, the
127 Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China, 
13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ. 313, 313 n.1 (2018).
128  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 2.
129  See generally Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at 
art. 62 (mentioning “online trading” but not defining “online trading”).
130 中华人民共和国立法法（2015) 年修订 [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Amended in 2015)] § President Order No 20 全国人大常委会 (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000), https://
www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/legislation-law-chinese-and-english-text. 
“There are four levels of laws and rules in China, namely, laws enacted by the NPC; 
administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council; local regulations enacted 
by local government; and rules introduced by all kinds of ministries affiliated with the 
State Council and departments of local government.” See Pinghui Xiao, Legislative 
Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China, 13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 313, 316 n.29 (2018).
131  高富平[Fuping Gao], 从电子商务法到网络商务法—关于我国电子商务立法定位
的思考 [From e - commerce law to online commerce law: A study of direction of 
e-commerce legislation in China], 法学[Law Science] 145–46 (2014).
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term of ‘online trading’ can be found in some administrative rules 
enacted by SAIC. For instance, the Measures for Online Trading was 
promulgated to regulate goods sold and services provided via the 
Internet in 2014.132 In other words, ‘online trading’ has been 
a pre-existing legal term before the introduction of the 2015 FSL 
Amendment in 2015 and the E-commerce Law in 2018. Other scholars 
have implies that China should have introduced an Online Trading 
Law rather than the E-commerce Law.133 The E-commerce Law, 
recognizes the doctrine of lex specialis, which has been endorsed 
in the Legislation Law by stipulating that “where any other law or 
administrative regulation provides rules for the sale of commodities or 
provision of services, such other law or administrative regulation shall 
apply.”134 Moreover, some scholars, by pointing out this provision, 
hold that the 2015 FSL Amendment is a special e-commerce law 
whereas the E-commerce Law is a general e-commerce law.135 If that 
is the case, it actually produces a paradox situation.
As far as online platforms are concerned, things become more 
complicated. The long-winded legal term, ‘online third-party food 
trading platform provider’ as mentioned early under the 2015 FSL
132  See 个体工商户登记管理办法 (2014修订) [Measures for the Administration of 
Registration of Individual Industrial and Commercial Households (2014 Revised)] 
(2014) (implementing measures “to standardize online commodity trading and 
related services, protect consumers’ and operators’ legitimate rights and interests and 
promote the sustainable and healthy development of [the] online economy”).
133  李一笑[Yixiao Li], 网络交易平台间接侵权之相关问题分析——以利益平衡为中心的
考量 [Analyses of several problems about the online marketplaces’ indirect liabilities: 
From the perpective of balance of interests], 网络法律评论[Internet Law Review] 74-5 
(2016).
134 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 2. As for 
the doctrine of lex specialis, according to the Legislation Law, for laws, administrative 
regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations, or rules 
developed by the same authority, if there is any discrepancy between special provisions 
and general provisions, special provisions shall prevail. See 中华人民共和国食品安全法
2015 年修订[Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in 
2015) art. 92] (2009) (China).
135  See e.g., 陆悦[Yue Lu], 网络食品合规治理再上层楼：当食品行业遇见《电子商务
法》[Online food trading regulation: China’s food industry in the age of E-commerce 
Law], 中国医药报[China Pharmaceutical News], (Sept. 20, 2018) 王峰[Feng Wang], 
滴滴顺风车案改写电商立法 平台违法或承担刑事责任 [Didi scandal 
restructures the E-commerce Law: platforms may assume criminal responsibilities], 21 
available at http://www.21jingji.com/2018/9-1/2NMDEzNzlfMTQ0NzE2NQ.html  世纪经济报道
[21 Century News](2018), (last visited Dec. 11, 2018).
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Amendment is undefined.136 Nevertheless, the term ‘online food 
platform provider’ is intentionally created with a view to 
distinguishing responsibilities and liabilities of platform providers 
from those of food business operators doing businesses within the 
platforms. That actually delivers a fundamental idea that a platform is a 
technologically-neutral intermediary, and that essentially “means that 
the provider of a platform [is treated] as a third-party entity[, who] 
should not be responsible for, or only in a limited way responsible for, 
any wrongdoings from [those] using the platform.”137 Online food 
platforms play a big role in shaping business modes and models of 
online food trading in China.138 The 2015 FSL Amendment implies that 
business models of online food trading can be divided into 
two main types, namely, self-built models and platform models.139 
Later measures enacted by the CFDA also explicitly confirm the above 
idea.140 In the course of China’s introduction of the 2015 FSL 
Amendment, WeChat, among other social media platforms, raised a 
compelling argument that social media platforms should not be treated 
as online food platforms in the sense that social media platforms are 
meant to be used as a communication tool rather than a trading one. 
However, the so-called ‘Micro Business’ involving individuals and 
SMEs selling foods via social media platforms has become a rising 
phenomenon in China, creating a form of so-called social media 
e-commerce.141 When China introduced the 2015 FSL Amendment 
it also launched Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Campaign, as 
mentioned earlier, to boost employment, and the Internet is considered 
a great means to generate prosperity and jobs.142 Largely due to this, 
136  See Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 62 
(creating obligations for “third-party online food trading platform[s]” but providing no 
specific definition for the term).
137  Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China, 
13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ., 313, 317 (2018).
138  Pɪɴɢʜᴜɪ Xɪᴀᴏ, Cʜɪɴᴀ›ꜱ Rɪꜱɪɴɢ Oɴʟɪɴᴇ Fᴏᴏᴅ Tʀᴀᴅɪɴɢ: Iᴛꜱ Iᴍᴘʟɪᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴꜱ Fᴏʀ ᴛʜᴇ 
Rᴇꜱᴛ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Wᴏʀʟᴅ 125–27 (Xinting Jia & Roman Tomasic eds., 2017).
139  Pinghui Xiao, China’s Wine and Liquor Laws in the “Internet Plus” Age, 1 Jus Vin 
Law 36 (2018).
140  Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China, supra note 
149, at 318.
141  See e.g., id. at 321–22.
142  Yue Zhang, Nation to boost entrepreneurship, innovation, Cʜɪɴᴀ Dᴀɪʟʏ (Sept. 7, 
2018, 
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undefined online platforms can leave more room for employment 
and better environment for innovation. However, when it comes to the 
E-commerce Law, because e-commerce is defined, which makes it 
predictable, the term ‘e-commerce platform’ can be equally 
predictable. By interpretation, it is safe to say that in this law that e-
commerce platforms can be so extensive that the E-commerce Law is 
applied to social media platforms and mobile applications. Therefore, 
it further implies that the platform obligations as laid down in the E-
commerce Law, are applied to those social media platforms involving 
food SMEs and ‘Micro Business’, which however, is very much 
contestable under the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster.  
While the harmonization of definitions can produce consistent 
legal predictability as far as the question of what platforms should take 
what responsibility is concerned, there is a further issue relating to 
harmonization of liabilities as laid down in the 2015 FSL Amendment 
and the E-commerce Law. 
Under the 2015 FSL Amendment, where the provider of 
an online food platform, in violation of this law, fails to assume the 
supervision tasks required by the law, which results in food business 
operators’ failure in food safety compliance, food authorities at 
or above the county level shall order it to take corrective action, 
confiscate its illegal income, and impose a fine of not less than RMB 
50,000 but not more than RMB 200,000 on it. However, under the E-
commerce Law, where an e-commerce platform business operator fails 
to take necessary measures  to ensure in-platform business operator 
conducts e-commerce lawfully, relevant authorities shall order the e-
commerce platform business operator to take corrective action within a 
specified period and may fine it not less than RMB 50,000 not more 
than RMB 500,000; or if the circumstances are serious, it shall be 
ordered to suspend business for rectification, in addition to a fine not 
less than RMB 500,000 but not more than RMB 2, 000,000.143 In terms 
of the fine intervals, the two laws vary greatly, which creates a 
question of how the administrative penalties should be applied as far as
8:54 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/07WS5b91cc35a31033b4f4654b65. 
html.
143  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 83.
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online food platforms are concerned.  
As far as online food platform liabilities are concerned, all 
the above factors combined create a few open questions: 1) should a 
social media platform, when used to trade in foods, be treated as an 
online food platform in the 2015 FSL Amendment or an e-commerce 
platform business operator under the E-commerce Law? 2) when an 
online food platform fails to assume supervision tasks as required by 
the law, should an administrative fine ranging from RMB 50,000 to 
RMB 200,000 under 2015 FSL Amendment be imposed upon the 
platform or should a fine ranging from 50,000 to RMB 2,000,000 be 
imposed upon it? In other words, there is a need for further 
harmonization.  
B. Harmonization of legislative aims and missions
It is necessary to examine the aims of different pieces of 
legislation at the outset in the sense that in most Chinese laws, their 
missions will be clearly articulated at the very beginning, upon which 
the directions of the laws in question will be largely based. We find 
varying missions in laws relating to food regulation. For instance, the 
E-commerce Law has two concurrent missions, namely, 1) to 
safeguard the lawful rights and interests of all parties to e-commerce, 
to regulate e-commerce conduct, and to maintain the market order, 
and 2) to promote the sustainable and sound development of 
e-commerce.144 But in the 2015 FSL Amendment, there is only one 
mission, and that is to ensure food safety and protect the physical 
health and life safety of the public.145 Questions arise as to whether 
there are conflicts between protecting human health on the one hand 
and promoting economy on the other. Admittedly, there are conflicts 
between protecting health and safety and promoting industry in the
144  See id. at art. 1. (drawing similarities to the E-commerce Law, the Law on Agri-
product Quality and Safety with the establishment of two concurrent missions, 
namely, to protect human health on one hand and to promote rural economy on the 
other); See e.g., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Nong Chan Pin Zhi Liang An 
Quan Fa ( 中华人民共和国农产品质量安全法) [Law on Agri-product Quality and 
Safety of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 2006, effective Nov. 1, 2006), art. 1.].
145  Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art 1.
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sense that we have past lessons and repeated bad examples in this 
regard, taking the BSE crisis in Europe and Melamine Milk Scandal in 
China into consideration.146 These two incidents have to do with agri-
food production, vividly showing conflicts that can occur when public 
agencies concurrently play a dual role in both industry promotion and 
health protection.
The conflicting aims and missions in the food e-commerce 
related legislation make harmonization of these laws an issue. The 
needs for harmonization in this regard are two-fold.
First, we have a within-law harmonization scenario. Because 
the E-commerce Law, simultaneously is aimed at regulation and 
industry promotion, there is a question of harmonizing those provisions 
bearing different missions within the same law. For example, the 
whole Chapter V, containing ten articles, is dedicated to promoting e-
commerce through various mechanisms and schemes.147 Numerous 
provisions relate to food e-commerce promotion as 
well, which very much involves small businesses and even ‘Micro 
Business’ as mentioned earlier. However, as far as agri-foods are 
concerned, “the state shall promote the application of Internet 
technologies in agricultural production, processing, and circulation[;]” 
encourage various social resources to strengthen cooperation; and 
promote the development of rural e-commerce.148 It is hoped that 
e-commerce can play a role in poverty alleviation.149 Many agri-food 
operators are small businesses in China. For instance, farmers sell agri-
foods produced in their own farms. Farmers in rural areas in China are 
relatively poor with limited job opportunities, and therefore agriculture 
becomes their main tools to generate wealth and prosperity. In 
addition, farmers are exempted from an ICR if they sell agricultural or 
sideline products produced in their farms over the Internet, for which 
no licenses are required by the law.150 These provisions relating to
146  See e.g., Pinghui Xiao, China’s Milk Scandals and Its Food Risk Assessment 
Institutional Framework, 2 Eur’n. J. Risk Reg. 397 (2011); Pinghui Xiao, 
China’s Food Standardization System, Its Reform and Remaining Challenges, 3 
Eur’n. J. Risk Reg. 507 (2012).    
147  See E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97.
148  Id. at art. 68.
149  Id. 
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agri-food e-commerce are created for the purpose of rural 
development. However, questions arise as to how these provisions 
will be harmonized with other e-commerce regulatory provisions 
within the E-commerce Law. There is a question as to which side, 
industry promotion or regulation, shall prevail when there are 
conflicts. 
Second, there is a between-law scenario harmonization. As for 
cross-border food e-commerce, it is even trickier. As observed by the 
OECD, the spread of the digital economy e.g., cross-border 
e-commerce poses challenges for international taxation.151 But 
the ever-increasing cross-border e-commerce is regarded as ‘an engine 
for growth’.152 And it is highly recognized by the Chinese government. 
Hence, the E-commerce Law stipulates that, the state shall promote 
cross-border e-commerce development; establish 
and improve administrative systems for customs, taxation, entry 
and exit inspection, and quarantine, among others, in line with the 
characteristics of cross-border e-commerce; and streamline procedures 
to facilitate cross-border e-commerce. Cross-border e-commerce 
platforms are encouraged to provide storage and logistics, customs 
declaration, inspection and quarantine declaration, and other services 
for cross-border e-commerce. The state shall support micro and small-
sized enterprises in engaging in cross-border e-commerce.153 For these 
product categories through cross-border e-commerce, the most popular 
among Chinese consumers are baby products, foods and cosmetics. 
This is largely due to domestic safety scandals and incidents in recent 
years.154 Quite a few business models of cross-border e-commerce 
emerge, among which the model of so-called ‘bonded warehouses’ 
goes like this: goods produced and marketed in a certain jurisdiction 
are shipped to Chinese consumers in China through Internet order.
150  Id. at art. 10.
151  Aᴅᴅʀᴇꜱꜱɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ Tᴀx Cʜᴀʟʟᴇɴɢᴇꜱ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Dɪɢɪᴛᴀʟ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍʏ, ACTION 1: 2015 
Fɪɴᴀʟ Rᴇᴘᴏʀt, OECD (2015).
152  Global Express Association, Let cross-border e-commerce be an engine for 
growth, WCO Nᴇᴡꜱ Mᴀɢᴀᴢɪɴᴇ, (Oct. 2015) at 50.
153  E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 71.
154  Anthony De Gennaro, China Cross-Border E-Commerce: New Challenges & 
Opportunities 2017, Dʀᴀɢᴏɴ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dragonsocial.net/
blog/china-cross-border-ecommerce/.
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These bonded warehouses, specifically purposed for storing 
overseas goods, allow merchants to bulk-ship products to China in 
private order over the Internet without necessarily being subjected to 
commercial import duties or strict quality control measures.155 Under 
the above provisions as laid down in the E-commerce Law, the model 
of bonded warehouses should not be a problem, since it is done in the 
name of cross-border e-commerce. Nevertheless, this act may violate 
the 2015 FSL Amendment. Because those foods are produced and 
marketed in other jurisdictions according to food laws thereof, they 
are not necessarily in compliance with Chinese food safety standards. 
Hence, according to the 2015 FSL Amendment, the foods in question 
may violate Chinese food safety requirements, so they should not have 
been allowed to be shipped to Chinese consumers. The tricky thing is, 
that to date there have been quite a few cases relating to cross-border 
food e-commerce through bonded warehouses, in which some court 
decisions have upheld the 2015 FSL Amendment, but others have 
been overturned. This makes harmonization of these two laws an open 
question in the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION
China has created a unique regulatory mechanism in which 
online platforms, considered third-party business entities, are 
obligated to monitor and supervise food business operators within the 
platforms. In other words, platforms are treated as co-regulators of 
food e-commerce. Through the lens of examination of legislative 
development, we find that online platforms are the key players for 
food e-commerce regulation, which are required to supervise online 
food business operators within the platforms. Online food platforms, 
though, as private players should co-regulate online food safety in 
close cooperation with government agencies. In case of any food 
safety non-compliance issues from the online food operators, the 
online platforms may be jointly punished by government agencies. 
This approach, though contestable, reflects the principle of co-
155  Id.
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governance as adopted in 2015 FSL Amendment cluster and is further 
recognized as so-called collaborative governance under the E-
commerce Law cluster. In other words, it creates a public-private co-
regulation scenario, which is a recognized practice in both law 
clusters.
Nevertheless, there is a challenge for harmonization of laws in 
terms of food e-commerce regulation, in which there are two facets to 
be considered. The first is concerning harmonization of definitions and 
resulting liabilities. While the harmonization of definitions can 
produce consistent legal predictability as far as the question of what 
platforms should take which responsibility is concerned, as a result 
there is a further issue relating to harmonization of liabilities as 
laid down in the 2015 FSL Amendment and the E-commerce Law. The 
second harmonization facet is concerning legislative aims and 
missions. The conflicting aims and missions as appearing in various 
pieces of legislation relating to food e-commerce make harmonization 
of these laws an issue.
In March 2018, the Chinese Central Government announced a 
mega reform scheme, in which CFDA will be merged into SAIC and 
another Ministry to create a new agency called State Administration 
for Market Regulation. It will be the implementing agency of the 
E-commerce Law and the 2015 FSL Amendment to regulate food
e-commerce.156 It remains to be seen what impact this institutional
reform will have upon harmonization of laws towards a better
regulation of food e-commerce in China.
156  韩韩江 [Han Shengjiang], 国家市场监督管理总局正式成立，张茅任局长毕井泉
任党组书记 [State Administration for Market Regulation is established, and Zhang 
Mao is Minister whereas Bi Jingquan is secretary of the Leading Party Members’ 
Group], 澎湃 [Tʜᴇ Pᴀᴘᴇʀ] (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_ 
forward_2036753.
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The world’s farms currently produce enough calories to ade-
quately feed everyone on the planet.2 From the 1960s through 2008, 
per capita food availability worldwide has risen from 2220 kilocal-
ories per person per day to 2790.3 Specifically, developing countries 
have recorded a rise in available kilocalories per person per day, from 
1850 to 2640.4 Yet, despite overall availability, around 815 million 
people still suffer from hunger or some form of malnutrition.5 
Approx-imately one in ten people are undernourished.6
Despite this grim reality there is room for hope. The global 
trend is moving in the right direction.7 Between 1990 and 2015, the 
“prevalence of undernourished people in developing countries de-
clined from 23.3 to 12.9 percent.”8 For the first time in history the end 
1  The author would like to thank his wife, daughter, and the rest of his family for 
their unyielding love and support. He would also like to thank his advisor, Professor 
Christopher Kelley, for his guidance. Finally, he would like to thank the Journal of 
Food Law and Policy’s Editorial Board and Staff Editors for all their hard work and 
suggestions. All errors are the authors and the authors alone. Michael Adkins is a JD 
candidate, with an expected graduation of May 2019.  
2  World Hunger, Poverty Facts, Statistics 2016 – World Hunger News, Hunger Notes, 
http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/ 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2018).
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations Et al., The State of Food 
Security and Nutrition in the World vi (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7695e. pdf 
[hereinafter The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017].
6  See United States Agency for int’l dev., U.S. Gov’t Global Food Security 
Strategy FY 2017-2021 2 (2016). https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1867/USG-Global-Food-Security-Strategy-2016.pdf (stating that “nearly 
800 million people around the world are chronically undernourished”).
7  See generally Sharad Tandon Et Al., Progress and Challenges in Global 
Food Security, United States Dep’t of Argic. (2017), http://ageconsearch.umn. 
edu/record/262131/files/eib-175.pdf?subformat=pdfa (finding that “[g]lobal food 
security has improved over the past 15 years, [though] challenges and opportunities 
remain.”).
8  Id. at 4.
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of hunger is within reach.9 But while “the world is [now] closer than 
ever before to ending global hunger,” United States (U.S.) policymak-
ers still face significant challenges.10 “Urbanization, gender inequality, 
[instability,] conflict, the effects of climate change,” and the inevitable 
rise in global population are all factors that must be addressed for any 
decline in world hunger to be sustainable.11 Over the last two de-cades, 
great progress has been made in global food security.12 In 2016, 
however, the number of global undernourished increased.13 While it is 
currently difficult to determine whether the downward trend is actu-
ally reversing, many challenges clearly lie ahead in the fight for food 
security.14
On July 20, 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Global 
Food Security Act of 2016 (the Act) into law.15 The Act authorized a 
“comprehensive strategic approach for United States (U.S.) foreign 
assistance to developing [nations.]”16 It was enacted to “reduce global 
poverty and hunger, achieve food and nutrition security, [and] promote 
inclusive, sustainable, agricultural-led economic growth...”17 It calls 
for a “whole-of-government”18 strategy, a modern approach that inte-
grates monitoring, evaluation, and learning aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of all global participants throughout the food and agricultural 
food system.19 Humanitarianism, however, was not the sole motiva-
tion behind the Act’s passage; it was also enacted for national security 
purposes.20 Expanded strategic engagement in countries rife with food 
insecurity “will improve [our] ability to anticipate and react to upheav-
al in regions crucial to U.S. national security.”21 Greater access and 
9  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 1.
10  Id. at 3.
11  Id. 
12  Tandon Et Al, supra note 7, at 4 .
13  The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 1.
14  Id. at ii.
15  Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016); Anuj 
Krishnamurthy, Feeding the Future? One Year After the Global Food Security Act, 
NewSecurityBeat (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/08/
feeding-future-one-year-after/.
16  Global Food Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-195, 130 Stat 675 (2016).
17  Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016).
18  Id. § 9302(b)(1) (2016).
19  United States Agency for int’l development, supra note 6, at iv. 
20  Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301(2) (2016). 
21  Cullen S. Hendrix, When Hunger Strikes: How Food Security Abroad 
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insight into the cultures and politics of these countries, at their most 
basic level, is a positive side effect to humanitarian relief. 
Various key elements are identified as objectives to help facil-
itate a successful implementation. The first is evidence based invest-
ment targeting – strategically focusing on areas and approaches where 
the greatest potential for sustainable improvements exists.22 The sec-
ond is implementing the “comprehensive, multi-faceted whole-of-gov-
ernment approach rooted in lessons learned” and best evidence that re-
flects emerging global and technological trends.23 Third is recognizing 
that the targeted countries must take the lead and be responsible for  
their own progress.24 Fourth is “[partnering with diverse] development 
actors and groups” to improve the “reach, effectiveness, efficiency, 
and sustainability” of U.S. investments.25 Fifth is “harnessing the 
power of science, technology, and innovation to dramatically 
improve” local capacity and agriculture system practices.26 And sixth 
is enhanced pro-gram sustainability so that eventually agricultural and 
developmental assistance to foreign nations is no longer necessary.27  
The Act is not a food aid bill; its scope, goals, and funding 
mechanisms are strategic. While in certain ways the Act expands upon 
existing U.S. commit-ments to provide acute humanitarian relief,28 its 
main goal is to assist in sustainable, targeted country development. 
At the World Food Congress in 1963, President John F. Ken-
nedy articulated a vision to eliminate world hunger: “as members of 
the human race, we have the means, we have the capacity to eliminate 
hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetimes. We need only the 
will.”29 Clearly, the goal he set forth has yet to materialize. Hunger, 
famine, drought, regional instability, and resource driven military 
Matters for National Security at Home 3 The Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs (2016), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/Report_When_ 
Hunger_Strikes_1604.pdf .
22  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii. 




27  United States Agency for int’l development, supra note 6, at iii.
28  Sharad Tandon Et Al., Progress and Challenges in Global Food Security 
3 (2017).
29  John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Remarks at the Opening 
Session of the World Food Congress, (June 4, 1963) (quoted by Susan E. Rice, Nat’l 
Sec. Advisor, Exec. Office of the president, Remarks at the Chicago Council Global 
Food Security Conference (May 22, 2014)). 
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conflict remain pervasive in a world whose population is projected to 
reach 9 billion by 2050.30 Many questions also remain on how 
humanity will respond and cope with climate change.31 Yet, modern 
sophisticated technologies from diverse sectors, coupled with rapid 
modes of communication and data sharing, are all available now, and 
the Act mandates they be utilized in the fight against food insecurity.32 
Kennedy’s words ring truer today than ever before in modern human 
history.33
II. Historical Overview of the Act’s Origins
For nearly six decades the U.S. has been a leader in the 
fight to end food insecurity.34 In the process, it has been the source of 
“about half of global food aid, as well as provided bilateral and 
multilateral support for agricultural development and trade.”35 Food 
aid programs of the 1950s were initially implemented as a means to 
“discharge food surpluses” while increasing the supply of food to the 
global poor.36 While these programs were meant to provide assistance, 
“in reality [they] proved [at times] problematic for many aid recipient 
countries.”37 For example, as the United States Agency for Internation-
al Development’s (USAID) Food for Peace program dumped surplus 
wheat into developing countries’ markets, these countries’ domestic 
food prices plummeted.38 In turn, local farmers could no longer com-
pete.39 Dependence on U.S. wheat increased, and by 1986, seven out 
of ten of the leading importers of U.S. farm commodities were Food 
for Peace recipients.40 Despite our efforts to alleviate global hunger, 
30  Cullen S. Hendrix, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, When Hunger 
Strikes: How Food Security Abroad Matters for National Security at Home 
(2016).
31  Responding to Climate Change, NASA Gʟᴏʙ. Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Cʜᴀɴɢᴇ, https://climate. 
nasa.gov/solutions/adaptation-mitigation/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
32  Feed the Future, The U.S. Government’s Global Food Security Research Strategy 7 
(2017), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/
GFS_2017_Research_Strategy_508C.pdf [hereinafter Feed the Future 2017] 
33  See United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii (discussing the 
ability to feed the world and imperativeness of doing so).
34  Sharad Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at 1. 
35  Id. at What Is the Issue?.
36  William D. Schanbacher, The Politics of Food 32 (2010).
37  Id. at 32–3. 
38  Id. at 33.
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
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by 2000, the dawn of the new millennium, an estimated 900 million 
people still were afflicted by food insecurity.41
A. Food Security
The definition of food security most frequently used today 
originates from the 1996 World Food Summit of the Food and Ag-
riculture Organizations of the United Nations (FAO): “food security 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”42 Most analysts 
define three primary attributes of food security.43 Some analysts, 
however, add a fourth.44 Availability is the first pillar and simply refers 
to the overall “supply” of food available, while the second pillar, 
access, refers to the “range of food choices open to people” based on 
their socioeconomic status.45 The concept of utilization comprises the 
third pillar and “reflects whether individuals and households make 
good use of the food” they have access to.46 The fourth pillar, stability, 
encom-passes all three of the above and perhaps is the most elusive; it 
refers to how susceptible individuals and households are to 
“interruptions in availability, access or utilization.”47 The Act has built 
in mechanisms to address all four of the food security pillars. 
However, it takes spe-cial aim at the fourth.48
B. The 2008 Food Price Crisis and a Modern Approach to Food
Security
In 2008, as food prices spiked as they had in the 1970s, the 
world experienced another food security crisis driven by market 
volatility.49 The World Bank estimated that due to the 2008 crisis, 
41  The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 2.
42  Sharad Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at 9. 
43  Christopher B. Barrett, Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability 6 
(Christopher B. Barrett ed., 1st ed. 2013). 
44   Id.
45  Id.
46  Id. at 7.
47  Id. 
48  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 72. 
49  Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, High Food Prices: The Food Security 
Crisis of 2007-2008 and Recent Food Price Increases – Facts and Lessons, FAO, 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/High_food_prices.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2018).
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50 million people were thrust back into poverty.50 Indeed, without an 
organized commitment, and due to the acute nature of the price 
increases, many actions taken in the wake of this crisis were tran-
sient,“[focusing] mainly on distribution of agricultural inputs” and not 
on a long-term goal of sustainability.51 This distribution of resources 
without “training, or other associated technical assistance,” limited the 
effect of the resources and did not lead to sustainable solutions.52 
Sustainability is “particularly [elusive] when underlying structural and 
management problems are not addressed.”53    
After the crisis of 2008, the U.S. increased focus on agri-
cultural development by increased spending and the creation of the 
Bureau for Food Security within USAID.54 But as a result of global-
ization, policy makers still wrestled with the “transition from the time 
when national food markets were more self-contained than the present 
global food system.”55 By 2010, food security was a top priority,56 and 
the Obama administration established Feed the Future, the U.S. gov-
ernment’s global hunger and food security initiative.57 From the be-
ginning, Feed the Future utilized a “whole of government” approach.58 
This framework would later be codified in the Act.59
On May 22, 2014, former National Security Advisor, Susan E. 
Rice, addressed the Chicago Council Global Food Security con-
ference.60 She spoke of the quantifiable successes of Feed the Future 
and suggested four areas of focus necessary for the “[achievement] of




54  Eric Munoz, The Global Food Security Act is Pushing to the Finish Line, Oxfam 
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/04/the-global-food-
security-act-is-pushing-to-the-finish-line /2016/04/the-global-food-security-act-is-
pushing-to-the-finish-line. 
55  Tim Josling, The Oxford Handbook on The World Trade Organization 655 
(Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012).
56  Id.; see Fᴇᴇᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Fᴜᴛᴜʀᴇ, https://www.feedthefuture.gov (last visited Dec. 13, 
2018) (evidencing the commitment and concern food security garnered in U.S. policy).
57  Munoz, supra note 54.
58  Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food Security Goals, 
11 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 9, 9 (2011). 
59  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 6.
60  Susan E. Rice, Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice at the Chicago 
Council Global Food Security Conference, The White House (May 22, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/22/remarks-national-
security-advisor-susan-e-rice-chicago-council-global-fo.
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food security on a global scale” for modern times.61 In fact, Feed the 
Future became a tremendous success and generated strong bipartisan 
support.62 Ultimately, Rice’s suggestions were largely adopted and 
codified in the Act,63 and the first comprehensive strategy to address 
global hunger was born.64 
The Act easily passed both chambers of Congress and com-
mits the U.S. to continued engagement in the fight to enhance global 
food security, reduce poverty, and improve nutrition.65 Pursuant to the 
Act, USAID published the Global Food Security Strategy to focus on 
achieving these goals through “three interrelated and interdependent 
objectives: (1) Inclusive and sustainable agricultural-led economic 
growth . . . (2) strengthened resilience among people and systems . . .  
and (3) a well-nourished population.”66
However, as of 2017, the U.S. is “one of the few [nations] in 
the world that [still] oppose the idea of a human right to food.”67 The 
right is not treated as a “formal enforceable obligation.”68 Traditional-
ly, the Bretton Woods institutions and the U.S. government “empha-
siz[e] liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the compression 
of domestic budgets.”69 At the 2002 World Food Summit in Rome, the 
Bush administration’s final statement articulated America’s approach 
to food security as premised not on an international human right to 
food, but on “local governments having the primary responsibility to 
provide for their citizens.”70 For purposes of retaining autonomy and 
flexibility the U.S. has consistently declined to participate in any “in-
61  Id. 
62  Liz Schrayer, The Surprise Bipartisan Success Story of Congress: American Aid, 
Tɪᴍᴇ (Sept. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4487397/bipartisan-success-congress/.
63  Compare Rice, supra note 60 (listing goals to achieve food security on a global 
scale), with Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016) (listing 
strategies to achieve global food security).
64  Anuj Krishnamurthy, Feeding the Future? One Year After the Global Food Security 
Act, NewSecurityBeat (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.newsecuritybeat. org/2017/08/
feeding-future-one-year-after/.
65  United States Agency for int’l Dev., supra note 6, at 7. 
66  Id. at iii.
67  The Human Right to Food and Dignity, Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛ Mᴀɢ., Vol. 37 (2010), https://
www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_ 
vol37_2010/winter2010/the_human_right_to_food_and_dignity.html.
68  Human Rights Council 13th Session, United States Explanation of Position 
on the Right to Food (L.17) (Mar. 24, 2010), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/179236.pdf.
69  Schanbacher, supra note 36, at 31. 
70  Id. 
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ternationally binding agreement to provide food security for the rest of 
the world.”71 
By broadly focusing on “partnership[s] with other govern-
ments, civil society, multilateral development institutions, research 
institutions, universities, and the private sector,” the Act largely 
adheres to this established ideological position; it does not depart from 
tradition.72 What follows is a comment on the Act’s framework that 
aims to demonstrate how and why it should be embraced. Whether the 
Act can meet its objectives in the existing global order is dependent on 
a multitude of factors and well beyond the scope of this paper. One 
thing, however, is certain. The old way of largely providing emergen-
cy assistance alone was not working to address the fundamental causes 
of food insecurity, and in a rapidly changing world, a new approach to 
combating global hunger is needed.73 This Act has great promise. 
III. Policy, Strategy, and the Whole-of-Government Approach
It is “in the national interest of the [U.S.]” to promote global
food security.74 Accordingly, as a matter of national security and for-
eign policy, the Act tasks the president with coordinating all relevant 
federal departments and agencies to implement the Global Food Secu-
rity Strategy efficiently and effectively.75 The relevant federal agencies 
are to provide “diverse, technical, programmatic, in-kind, and finan-
cial contributions” that must be coordinated.76 The strategy proposed 
to accomplish this is by “[building] upon platforms and enhanced 
mechanisms at the global, regional, and country levels to leverage 
71  Id. at 32.
72  See generally, United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6 (listing broad 
objectives without required obligations).
73  See generally The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5 
(outlining what is needed to increase global food security and nutrition).
74  22 U.S.C. § 9302(a) (2016).
75  Id. at § 9302 (3)(b) (2016). See id. at § 9304(c)(1) (2016) (mandating that all 
relevant agencies submit to the appropriate congressional committees… an agency 
specific plan how to for implementing the Act). 
76  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38. See 22 U.S.C. § 
9301(4)(7) (2016) (defining relevant federal departments and agencies as the “United 
States Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 
the Peace Corps, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the United 
States African Development Foundation, and the United States Geological 
Survey . . .”). 
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technical expertise, data, and resources.”77 Efficient coordination of 
each agency’s research investments are therefore critical to the suc-
cessful implementation of this Act.78 Necessarily, “research themes”79 
were identified to ensure all “stages of the food security [research and 
development] pipeline,” across all varying agencies and partner coun-
tries, are united toward the same ends.80 In light of all the challenges 
standing in the way of food security, research and development will 
prove to be one of, if not the most, crucial components in the fight.81
Similarly, for flexibility and fiscal responsibility the strate-gy 
makes clear that “regular consultation and collaboration with key 
stakeholders [and pertinent] congressional committees” will take 
place, so as to “avoid duplication of [American] investments.”82 In 
fact, accountability for results and transparency are central elements of 
the monitoring, evaluation, and learning approach the Act utilizes to 
track progress.83 Built into the structure of the Strategy is the constant 
pursuit of the efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars.84
IV. Interrelated and Interdependent Objectives of the Act
A. Inclusive and Sustainable Agricultural-led Economic
Growth:
77  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38.
78  See generally Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32 (discussing the need for 
cooperation and coordination in addressing global food insecurity).
79  Id. at 7 (“I. Technologies and practices that advance the productivity frontier to 
drive income growth, improve diets and promote natural resource conservation; II. 
Technologies and practices that reduce, manage and mitigate risk to support resilient, 
prosperous, well-nourished individuals, households, and communities; and III. 
Improved knowledge on how to achieve human outcomes: generating evidence on how 
to sustainably and equitably improve economic opportunity, nutrition and resilience).
80  Id.
81  Id. at 9. 
82  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38. See 22 U.S.C. § 
9303(5) (2016) (defining “key stakeholders” as “actors engaged in efforts to 
advance global food security programs and objectives, including relevant 
Federal departments and agencies; national and local governments; other bilateral 
donors; international and regional organizations; international, regional, and local 
financial institutions; international, regional, and local private voluntary, 
nongovernmental, faith-based, and civil society organizations; the private sector, 
including agribusinesses and relevant commodities groups; agricultural producers, 
including farmers organizations, cooperatives, small-scale producers, and 
women; and agricultural research and academic institutions, including land grant 
universities and extension services”).
83  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 13.
84  Id.
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Agricultural led growth builds from the ground up and strives 
to ensure the “availability of food [while] generating income from 
production” for those at the greatest risk of food insecurity.85 Agri-
cultural led growth also aims to “[create] employment and [entrepre-
neurial] opportunities throughout the value chain.”86 When there is 
broad, inclusive employment in the agriculture sector, especially for 
smallholder farms, local partners can decrease their reliance on inputs 
from development assistance programs.87 Smallholder farms are those 
cultivated on two hectares or under.88 Over half the people in poor 
countries who “[work in the] agriculture sector . . . live in smallholder 
households.”89 In many instance these people are vulnerable to the 
climate and “markets… and rely substantially on self-provisioning.”90 
Sustainable output of smallholder agriculture is therefore vital for 
global food security.91 
B. Strengthened Resilience Among People and Systems:
In underdeveloped regions, people caught in the cycle of
poverty have more difficulty sustainably emerging from poverty when 
“shocks and stresses” to the environment and political landscape 
occur.92 Increased resilience among these populations is therefore vital 
for sustainable food security.93 But without reliable markets, civil insti-
tutions, or infrastructure to mitigate stressors or food shortages, the 
cycle of poverty and hunger will persist. Thus, strengthening the resil-
iency of people will necessarily involve investment in infrastructure.94 
85  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 28.
86  Id.
87  Id. at 8.
88  Rebecca Nelson & Richard Coe, Transforming Research and Development Practice 
to Support Agroecological Intensification of Smallholder Farming, 67 J. Int’l Aff. 
107, 107 (2014).
89  Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ 
1 (2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/
Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf [hereinafter Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀꜱ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ]. 
90  Nelson & Coe, supra note 88, at 108.
91  Id. 
92  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii.
93  Id. at 8.
94  Id. at 14–15.
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With strengthened infrastructure, nations will be able to increase pro-
duction sustainably, thus mitigating risk and enhancing recovery from 
environmental and political stressors.95 Despite inevitable “shocks and 
stresses,” improved infrastructure will strengthen resiliency and allow 
progress in the agricultural sector to take hold. Ultimately it will 
“[reduce] reliance upon emergency food assistance.96
C. A Well-nourished Population:
While adequate nutrition is important to men, women, and 
children of all ages, the Act focuses especially on women and chil-
dren, from the time of the child’s conception until the child turns 
two.97 Undernutrition during this vulnerable period can produce “low-
er levels of educational attainment” and limit lifetime productivity.98 
Further, women on average provide “43 percent of the agricultural 
labor force of developing countries.”99 Women’s continued and in-
creased participation is thus an essential ingredient for sustainability in 
production systems.100 Improved sanitation and clean water is another 
factor address by the Strategy.101 Ultimately, the Strategy’s objective is 
to “[increase] consumption of nutritious and safe” foods in healthy 
household and communities.102
V. Key Elements Identified to Strengthen Ability to Achieve
Objectives
A. Targeting Investments
Since the release of the Strategy, the “first twelve Feed the 
Future” target countries were selected.103 These countries were 
deemed to possess the “greatest potential [for] the sustainable 
[improvement of] food security” for their people.104 The U.S. has 
chosen these countries as partners with the goal of “[harnessing] the 
95  Id. at 8.
96  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 9.
97  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii. 
98  Id.
99  Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ, supra note 89, at 1.
100  Id. 
101  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 22. 
102  Id. at 10.
103  Feed The Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7.  
104  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii. 
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power of agriculture to jumpstart their economies.”105 The countries 
include: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, 
Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.106
The criteria used to select target countries included: (1) the 
level of need; (2) potential for agricultural-led growth; (3) opportu-
nities for [local] partnership; (4) opportunities for regional economic 
integration; (5) U.S. Government resource availability; and (6) the 
targeted government’s commitment to food security investment and 
policy reform.107 While specific beneficiaries will be targeted for 
short term and medium term impact, the overall strategy is to 
improve in-stitutions, markets, choices, and opportunities at a 
systemic level.108 A wide variety of actors from the public sector, 
private sector, and civil society will be engaged.109
B. Developing Countries Must Take the Lead
The Act is structured to respond to the inherent diversity of 
farming practices and needs of the target countries.110 The Strategy 
thus requires target countries to “own and be empowered to lead and 
guide efforts to drive [their own] progress.”111 This model is designed 
to address one of the significant challenges of global food security, 
namely, that there “is no ‘one size fits all’” approach to improving 
conditions, markets, and yields for farmers.112 As reflected in the 
selection criteria, support will be lent to those countries whose na-
tional and local governments actively coordinate and develop institu-
tional capabilities and accountability mechanisms that provide strong 
105  Sasha Jenkins, US Takes Step Forward in Fight Against Global Hunger, Global 
Citizen (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/us-fights-
against-global-hunger/.
106  Feed The Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7. 
107  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 36. 
108  Id. at 37.
109  Id.
110  See Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9302 (2016) (stating the 
policy objective of “promoting global food security” and listing the various 
programs, activities, and initiatives that reinforce national food security investment 
plans).
111  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 41. 
112  Jefferey D. Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development 327 (2015) (“Farmers 
differ incredibly in what they grow; how they grow it; and the challenges of climate, 
soil, water, topography, pests, biodiversity, and transport costs they face. These 
variations in turn have an enormous farm systems and strategies.”).
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working relationships with both the private sector and civil society.113  
Active coordination between the private and public sectors, coupled 
with direct U.S. involvement, will yield localized (particularized) 
solutions tailored to local conditions leading to food insecurity in the 
target countries. The aggregate of insights into local solutions to food 
insecurity are a step developing “solutions for a global sustainable 
food supply.”114
C. Local Capacity and Partnerships
Of course, there are risks and vulnerabilities inherent in 
work-ing with local populations; they may include: (1) weak systems 
and internal controls; (2) limited capacity; and (3) competing 
[political, social, or cultural] interests.115 Ineffective, corrupt, or toxic 
localized politics may also stifle technological development and 
productiv-ity.116  Yet, partnerships with key stakeholders will allow the 
U.S. 
to “leverage the required skill, expertise, technologies, assets, and 
resources to improve our effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability 
of development efforts.”117 The goal is to achieve a diverse, 
transparent, inclusively broad range of partners118 that not only include 
those in the public and private sectors, but also those in research 
centers, educa-tional organizations,119 and multilateral development 
institutions.120 
VI. Science, Technology, Innovation, and the Sustainability of
Programs
At the heart of the Act’s objective is to achieve inclusive, 
sustainable growth that builds resiliency among the people of 
113  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 41. 
114  Sachs, supra note 112, at 327–28. 
115  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 42. 
116  See id. at 111 (stating that “corruption--the abuse of entrusted authority for 
private gain-- remains a tremendous obstacle to political, social, and economic 
development” and that “corruption affects food security by widening the gap 
between rich and poor, deterring investment, and distorting markets”).
117  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 43. 
118  See id.
119  Id. at 44.
120  Id. 
121  Id. at iii.
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participating nations – for the purpose of maintaining a well-nourished 
population.121 The Strategy breaks this objective into three distinct 
categories, yet they can be read as one, with sustainability being the 
operative word.122 As the Strategy frames it, sustainability requires that 
“all development investments should catalyze the economic, political, 
and social processes within those countries [to] yield ever-improving 
lives for their citizens.”123 
Proponents of the Act understand that sustained investments 
in science and technology are critical for development and a sustain-
able reduction in global food insecurity.124 Scientific advancement and 
technological innovation are therefore mandated by the Act;125 
accordingly, relevant U.S. agencies have identified three overarching 
research themes for each agency to pursue in the context of their own 
expertise.126 This coordinated effort aims to ensure that diverse agency 
actions remain in constant pursuit of the Act’s objectives, no matter 
who, what, when, or where the relevant agency interacts with the 
partner country’s agricultural sector.127 While theme I and II deal with 
“scalable products and practice that [advance productivity, nutrition, 
and risk mitigation,]” theme III takes a more anthropological approach 
and seeks to understand the people of the target countries in a cultural 
context.128
Research under theme III is arguably the most important. It 
guides how and where research, program implementation, and tech-
nology are to be deployed for the most equitable distribution of food 
security advancements.129 How people benefit is the ultimate test of 
the Act’s merit: but without understanding the specific needs of the 
people in target countries or how they interact with their political, 
cultural, ecological, or global environments - in stable and unstable 
times - food security will likely prove illusive.130 Theme III, through 
its focus on “human behavior,” is designed to address these 
concerns.131 Theme I is focused on the micro level and works to 
increase crop yields, production efficiency, quality of nutrition, and
122  See id.
123  Id. at 42.
124  Id. 46.
125  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 12; See Global Food Security Act 
of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9302(a)(7) (2016).
126  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7. 
127  Id.
128  Id.
129  Id. at 22.
130  Id. at 22–24.
131  Id.
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the value of agricultural products across the farm to market supply 
chain.132 Theme II is con-cerned with safety, the promotion of 
resilience, and the mitigation of risk.133 Many partners throughout 
the U.S. government, private sector, universities, colleges, civil 
society, and partner countries are tasked with implementing the 
research strategy.134
In sum, the Act’s pervasive focus on perfected sustainability 
is a departure from food aid programs of the past, has refined and 
built upon current approaches to global food security and nutrition, 
and has set U.S. policy with respect to agricultural assistance on a 
proactive rather than reactive course.135 Further, the research themes 
provide for flexible innovation over time, are aimed at culturally 
sensitive advancement, and cover all pillars upon which food security 
rests. They aim to enhance the interplay between all the elements 
mentioned above with the overarching goal of sustainability.136 
VI. Can the World Expect a Future Free from Hunger?
A. Climate Change in a Changing World:
Climate change is an artificially controversial topic. There is 
broad consensus among the scientific community that the climate is in 
fact changing, temperatures are in fact rising, and that the activities of 
man are very likely a cause of its acceleration.137 Therefore, as peo-ple 
struggle with climate change, the continued focus on women and 
smallholder farms in the fight against global hunger is essential: “well 
managed smallholder systems invest in building soil biomass and 
vegetative cover [to improve] water filtration in case of floods, and 
moisture retention” in the event of drought.138 Smallholder farms also 
132  Id. 17–19.
133  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 17–19.
134  See 22 U.S.C. § 9302(a)(3), (7), (8) (describing policy objectives behind the 
Global Food Security Act); Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 20.
135  See generally United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 
46 (describing methods that provide infrastructure, knowledge, and research 
for continuing sustainability).
136  Id. at 10 fig. 1.
137  See generally U.S. Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Cʜᴀɴɢᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Pʀᴏɢʀᴀᴍ, Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Sᴄɪᴇɴᴄᴇ Sᴘᴇᴄɪᴀʟ 
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ: Fᴏᴜʀᴛʜ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Assᴇssᴍᴇɴᴛ (NCA4) Vᴏʟᴜᴍᴇ I (2017), https://
science2017.globalchange.gov (finding incredibly strong evidence supporting the 
existence of climate change the role of human activity in its rapid acceleration). 
138  Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ, supra note 89, at 2. 
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have less dependence on fossil fuels and lower energy requirements.139 
Further, traditional smallholder practices may also reduce emission 
and enhance soil carbon sequestration.140 The uncertainty of climate 
change is all the more reason a flexible, sustained, whole-of-govern-
ment approach is needed. “Continuous learning, adaptation, and com-
munication through monitoring and evaluation” is required to compre-
hend and respond to the many changing and unknown variables our 
researchers and policymakers will face.141
B. Conflict, Instability, and the Global Economy:
With an increased global population comes increased 
compe-tition for resources and thus the potential for continued 
conflict. It is estimated by 2050, 9 billion people will inhabit this 
planet.142 In 2016, with a global population of only 7.5 billion,143 there 
were 19 countries marred by violence, civil war, or natural disaster.144 
It is no surprise that countries in the grips of conflict or natural 
calamity are more susceptible to persistent food insecurity.145 In fact, 
over half of the world’s “chronically undernourished” reside in 
countries in conflict.146 And from those countries, an estimated 100 
million face “crisis-level food insecurity.”147 While traditional, 
interstate warfare has decreased, the prevalence of intrastate conflict 
has risen.148 But in the age of glo-balization many of these internal 
conflicts are of regional and global concern and have implications 
well beyond their borders.149
Furthermore, certain aspects of the global economy are “wide-
ly associated with ongoing global food insecurity.”150 For example, 
economic policies that traditionally develop in wealthy, industrialized 
139  Id. 
140  Id.
141  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 19 (discussing methods for increasing 
adaptation and recovery from shocks and stress).
142  See, e.g., Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at iii.
143  E.g., U. S. Census Bureau, U.S. ᴀɴᴅ Wᴏʀʟᴅ Pᴏᴘᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Cʟᴏᴄᴋ, (Mar. 13, 2018) 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/.
144  The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 30.
145  Id. at 35.
146  See id. (calculating the figure at 489 million out of a total of 815 million people). 147  
The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 30.
148  Id. at 33.
149  Id.
150  Jennifer Clapp, World Hunger and the Global Economy: Strong Linkages, Weak 
Action, 67 J. Int’l Aff. 1, 2 (2014).
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countries often contribute to “higher… more volatile food prices 
and uneven distribution of food and agricultural assets.”151 Higher food 
prices and the ensuing volatility can thus lead to, or exacerbate, 
political instability.152 Price volatility is especially tough on rural 
communities because when prices are unstable, smallholder farmers 
cannot compete. They can lose their incentive to produce and lose their 
land.153 While no specific trade policies are provided in the Act, 
research theme III is designed to provide solutions to these complex 
political, economic issues.154 The Act, by using the whole-of-gov-
ernment approach, works to address the problems caused by global 
conflict and unstable markets.155 It does so by employing agencies 
whose personnel are in direct, on the ground contact with the people in 
the world’s poorest countries where they can provide the change and 
support from the bottom up.156 
C. Potential Shortcomings of the Act:
The Feed the Future Report states that no “legal or regulatory 
impediments to implementation of the [strategy]” were identified.157
However, as stated above, regions in conflict will remain outside of 
the Act’s reach due to the degree of cooperation and stability within a 
target country required by the Act. 
VII. Progress and State of the Act Since Passage
What began in 2009 as the Feed the Future initiative, by 2015 
had “helped [millions of] farmers gain access to new tools and tech-
nologies.”158 The initiative had therefore helped millions of “farmers 
and producers [improve] their crop yields.”159 Millions of children 
were also affected by the implementation of nutrition programs.160 In 
151  Id.
152  Hendrix, supra note 21, at 3.
153  Karen Hausen-Kuhn, Making Trade Policy Serve Global Food Security Goals, 11 
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 9, 10-11 (2011). 
154  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 22-24. 
155  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 28.
156  See id. at 45.
157  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 24. 
158  Annika Reno, How Obama’s Feed the Future Initiative Helped Millions in 2015, 
Global Citizen (Aug. 6, 2016) https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/
obamas-feed-the-future-initiative-impacts-millions/. 
159  Jenkins, supra note 105.
160  Id.
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2016 alone, Feed the Future reached “nearly eleven million small-
scale food producers.”161 In partnership with USAID it “trained more 
that 3.7 million people in child health and nutrition; it also trained 
thousands of local health facilities on how to effectively cope with 
malnutrition.162 By July 19, 2017, approximately one year after the 
Act’s passage,163 118 bipartisan lawmakers and advocates gathered in 
Washington, D.C., to “celebrate [its] success.”164 Those congregated 
“expressed continued dedication to food security initiatives like those 
implemented under the Act.”165 Food security was a “great unifier.”166
The Act of 2016 was “one of the few bipartisan pieces of 
legislation to emerge in recent years.”167 Initially, under the Trump 
administration, there was a markedly divergent direction in policy 
priorities.168 For example, in early November of 2017, the Undersec-
retary of International Affairs at the Treasury Department announced 
that “the U.S. is not expecting to make any future contributions to the 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP),” a multi-
lateral development institution implicated in the Act.169 This program, 
administered by the World Bank, “channels member pledges of assis-
tance to developing countries agriculture projects.”170
However, in 2018, again with broad bipartisan support, the 
Act was reauthorized.171 But only time will tell if the Act is imple-
mented as Congress intended, or if the Act survives another reautho-
161  Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 3.
162  Id.
163  Anuj Krishnamurthy, supra note 15.
164  See Avery Friedman, Celebrating a Year of Success for the Global Food Security 
Act, Global Citizen (July 20, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/gfsa-
year-food-security-event/. 
165  Id.
166  Michael J. Puma & Peter B. de Menocal, Trump’s Unifying Opportunity: Food 





169  Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Treasury Takes Aim at Global Food Security 
Program, Foreign Policy (Nov. 10, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/10/
treasury-takes-aim-at-global-food-security-program-obama-agriculture-farmers/. 
170  Jennifer Clapp, supra note 150.
171  Global Food Security Reauthorization Act Confirms US Commitment to Food 
Security, The  Chicago  Council  on  Global  Affairs  (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.thechicagocouncil.org/press-release/global-food-security-reauthorization-act-
confirms-us-commitment-food-security.
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rization. Regardless, the Act’s modern approach to food security is a 
model for how best to unify and apply the strengths of our public and 
private sector alike to a problem that without strong, dedicated, global 
leadership, will unquestionably remain.  
VIII. Conclusion
Sustenance in the form of food and water is behind only 
ox-ygen as the most fundamental ingredients essential for human exis-
tence.172 Without it, there is little hope. Not only is the cycle of 
poverty and malnourishment devastating to those who experience it 
directly, food insecurity leads to instability in the broader world. It 
lays fertile ground for extremism and conflict, directly affecting 
national security. Continued adherence to this Act and the continued 
focus on improving the lives of the most vulnerable will not only 
produce a positive return on our investments, but it is the right thing to 
do. In the long run its approach and built in mechanisms for flexibility 
allow for continued learning and adaptation to the changing world 
from the ground up.173
The Act is the American government’s current approach to 
combating food insecurity. One thing, however, is certain: our leaders 
must maintain the will to implement the Act as designed. It must not 
be starved of funding. Despite its shortcomings and limitations, the 
Act is an example of American foreign policy at its best. Taking into 
account our global reach, tools, and the technologies at our command, 
we have the power to make a difference in one of the most funda-
mental, visceral issues of our time. Food insecurity will assuredly not 
dissolve overnight, but through sustained engagement with the devel-
oping world, we can work pragmatically to help break the cycle that 
leads to perpetual poverty, malnourishment, and starvation. It would 
be unwise for our leadership to squander such strong bipartisan sup-
port, agreement, and momentum. It would be an abdication of global 
leadership on an issue we are uniquely equipped to solve. This strate-
gy is not zero sum. For if one family starves, or one child dies, 
wheth-er in our own neighborhood or a world and culture away, we all 
suffer. One way or another, whether it be refugees fleeing famine, 
extremists sewing instability in vulnerable lands, volatile commodity 
172  See Five Basic Needs to Survive and Thrive, Santevia (June 16, 2016), https://
www.santevia.com/blog/5-basic-needs-to-survive-and-thrive/.
173  United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 6.
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prices, or personal feelings of guilt, sadness, empathy, or 
powerlessness – chron-ic global hunger touches us all. 
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